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Patents & The Progress of Personalized Medicine:
Biomarkers Research as Lens
Matthew Herder*
I. INTRODUCTION

"Personalized medicine" has enormous capital at the moment. It is the
promise that start-up biotech firms and mainstay pharmaceutical companies
alike claim they will deliver,' the cornerstone of proposals for healthcare
reform,2 the subject of the penultimate report by former President George
Bush's Advisory Council on Science and Technology, 3 and the object of
legislation once introduced by newly elected President Barack Obama.
With industry, policy-makers, and politicians all seemingly on board, there
appears to be great interest in removing any barriers to realizing
* Matthew Herder, B.Sc. (hons), L.L.B., L.L.M., J.S.M., Visiting Professor, Loyola
University Chicago School of Law, 2008-2009. This article is based on a presentation given
at Loyola University Chicago School of Law's Second Annual Beazley Symposium on
Access to Health Care, "Perspectives on Patents Versus Patients: Can they Co-Exist?" in
November 2008. The author would like to thank Professor Cynthia Ho for helpful feedback
early in the writing process as well as the editorial staff of the Annals of Health Law for their
tremendous efforts translating this article into its final form.
1. See generally Biotechnology Industry Organization, Targeting Disease Through
Pharmacogenomics & Personalized Medicine, http://www.bio.org/healthcare/personalized/
(last visited Feb. 10, 2009).
2. See BRUCE QUINN, CROSSING THE THREE CHASMS: COMPLEX MOLECULAR TESTING
AND

MEDICARE

REGULATIONS

2

(2008),

http://www.foleyhoag.com/-/media/Files/

Publications/Generic/2008%2OFoley%2OHoag%20Crossing%20Chasms%2OMolec%2OMed
.ashx.
3. See generally PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., PRIORITIES FOR
PERSONALIZED MEDICINE (2008), http://www.ostp.gov/galleries/PCAST/pcast-report-v2.pdf

[hereinafter PCAST].
4. The Genomics and Personalized Medicine Act of 2007 was introduced by thenSenator Barack Obama on Mar. 23, 2007. A modified version of the legislation, the
Genomics and Personalized Medicine Act of 2008, was subsequently introduced by Rep.
Patrick Kennedy on July 15, 2008. Neither bill passed, but the specifics of the latter bill will
be discussed infra Part II.A. See generally Genomics and Personalized Medicine Act of
2007, S. 976, 110th Cong. (2007); Genomics and Personalized Medicine Act of 2008, H.R.
6498, 110th Cong. (2008).
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personalized medicine's full potential.
The most immediate barrier concerns the poor quality of the technologies
that have been developed to date. This is, in significant part, attributable to
the complexity of the science. The human genome warrants greater
humility than we perhaps imagined. 5 However, it is also partly attributable
to deficiencies in the present regulatory framework, including unclear
criteria for evaluating product risk, ambiguous standards of study design,
and redundant requirements from different regulatory authorities.6 Because
of these deficiencies, or perhaps in spite of them, much of the relevant
research and commercial activity has escaped regulatory oversight. And the
clinical utility of most developed technologies appears to have suffered as a
result.
However, this quality barrier is also a problem of coordination. The
President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST)
explains, with reference to genomics-based molecular diagnostics, the
technology that it foresees as having
the "greatest potential to accelerate
7
progress in personalized medicine:",
Despite the promise of genomics-based molecular diagnostics to advance
personalized medicine, significant challenges remain in validating the
genomic/clinical correlations required to advance these products into
clinical use. While an increasing number of candidate genetic markers are
being discovered, clinical validation of these markers has proceeded at a
slow pace. To correct this imbalance between discovery and validation,
public and private sector research will need to be coordinated and
prioritized more effectively, 8and the tools required for validation studies
will need to be strengthened.
To address this coordination failure, PCAST recommends that the federal
government (through the auspices of the National Institutes of Health) make
critical investments in three enabling tools, specifically: (1) "collections of
high quality biological specimens accompanied by comprehensive disease
annotation;" (2) "study designs addressing biomarker standardization and
incorporating the sophisticated statistical methods necessary for
demonstrating the clinical validity and utility of genomic profiles;" and, (3)
5. Recent calls for a large-scale effort to map the human "epigenome"-a "layer of
information ...embedded in the special proteins that package the DNA," that is highly
variable between different cells in the body, over time, and in response to environmental
stimuli, yet still inheritable--only underscore the point. Nicholas Wade, From One Genome,
Many Types of Cells. But How?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2009, at D4; see also Peter A. Jones et
al., Moving AHEAD with an International Human Epigenome Project, 454 NATURE 711
(2008).
6. PCAST supra note 3, at 3.
7. Id. at 1.
8. Id.at2.
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"large population cohorts for longitudinal health and disease studies."
Each of these tools is indeed critical to future generations of technologies
befitting of the name personalized medicine. What the PCAST report and
other accounts of personalized medicine's shortcomings fail to contemplate,
however, is the role played by intellectual property rights (especially
patents) in this problem of coordination. In fact, PCAST explicitly carved
off intellectual property issues for separate study,'0 painting intellectual
property as a kind of incentives problem (noting that recent events have
"threatened the stability of intellectual property protection in the
biosciences" that is "essential for pharmaceutical and biotechnology
companies")" as opposed to a factor contributing to the problem of
coordination amongst scientists, research institutions, healthcare providers,
and commercial actors.
The hypothesis advanced in this paper is exactly the opposite. Contrary
to what PCAST suggests, intellectual property issues cannot be easily
disentangled from other barriers facing personalized medicine, particularly
the deficiencies of the present regulatory framework. Nor can they be cast
primarily as a problem of industry incentives. Rather, understanding these
intellectual property issues is critical to understanding the paucity of
relationships and data sharing between researchers, healthcare providers,
and private firms, which, in turn, help to explain why the quality of research
expected to feed into personalized medicine has so far suffered. Unless
these issues are addressed, progress toward the goal of personalized
medicine will be impeded significantly, and no substantial gains will be
made from creating large-scale biospecimen repositories.
The bulk of this paper aims to substantiate this hypothesis and
underlying claims, devising a set of future research questions to gauge how
deep this barrier to personalized medicine is, and what corrective measures
may be more or less effective. As a secondary objective, the paper explores
why these intellectual property issues have received minimal attention to
date and concludes that the way the current discourse around the impact of
intellectual property rights upon early stage scientific research has been
framed may be partially to blame. Before beginning this two-fold task, it is
useful to place some boundaries on the analysis and explain why some
visions of personalized medicine appear more worthy of pursuit than others.

A. PersonalizedMedicine & PopulationHealth
The meaning of the phrase "personalized medicine" varies depending
upon the scientific context in which it is used. In one subset of stem cell
9. Id.at 2-3.
10. Id.at 22.
11. PCAST, supra note 3, at 21.
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research that involves cloning embryonic stem cells, the idea is to develop
stem cell based therapies that are uniquely suited to individual persons.
Personalized stem cell medicine, if realized, will be literally personal.
Outside cloning-based embryonic stem cell research, the personal becomes
aspirational. Research into genes, proteins, metabolic pathways, and the
dynamic interactions amongst those biological elements, as well as the
impact of and the environmental and social factors upon those
elements/interactions-what some now group under the heading
"biomarkers" research 2 -is
ultimately intended to stratify patient
populations, for example, in terms of how well they will respond to a
particular course of drug therapy. However, no one intends that biomarkers
research will culminate in drugs for a population of one.
Interest in developing patient-specific stem cell lines (and subsequent
therapies) via cloning stems from the nature of the human immune system.
Any transplantation of cells, tissues, or organs from one human body to
another carries the risk of immune rejection.13 Generating cells, tissues, or
organs through cloning technology theoretically negates this risk.' 4 But
while this line of research would appear well-intentioned for future
individual recipients, others argue--convincingly-that the pursuit of
cloning-based embryonic stem cell research is antithetical to overall
population health in the present. Cloning technology is horribly inefficient.
Producing two cloned nonhuman primate embryonic stem cell lines
required 304 eggs from 14 rhesus macaques-an efficiency of 0.7%. 15 In
12. See discussion infra Part II. for a detailed overview of this area of research. Wilson
and colleagues offer the following summary:
Biomarkers are molecular, biological, or physical attributes that characterize a
specific underlying (patho) physiological state and that can be objectively
measured and evaluated to detect or define disease progression, or predict or
quantify therapeutic responses. Classic biomarkers have encompassed surrogate
physiological measurements (heart rate, blood pressure), images (chest
radiography), and protein molecules (cardiac enzymes). The sequencing of the
human genome, in conjunction with advanced analytical technologies, have made
possible a new generation of molecular markers, including single-nucleotide
polymorphism (SNP) analysis, genomic and proteomic profiling.., which carry
the promise of increased disease-related sensitivity and specificity coupled with
higher dimensional complexity to provide greater individualized disease
management.
C. Wilson et al., Biomarker Development, Commercialization, and Regulation:
Individualization of Medicine Lost in Translation, 81 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY &
THERAPEUTICS 153, 153 (2007).
13. See Rudolph Jaenisch, The Biology of Nuclear Cloning and the Potential of
Embryonic Stem Cells for TransplantationTherapy, in PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS,
MONITORING
STEM
CELL
RESEARCH
app.
N,
at
387-417
(2004),
http://bioethicsprint.bioethics.gov/reports/stemcell/pcbe-final-version-monitoring-stem-cel
Iresearch.pdf.
14. Id.
15. J.A. Byrne et al., ProducingPrimateEmbryonic Stem Cells by Somatic Cell Nuclear
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humans, hundreds of thousands of eggs would seem to be needed to create a
single cloned embryonic stem cell line. 16 Given this, the cost of any therapy
resulting from a personalized stem cell line would be prohibitive perhaps
even for the most wealthy of society. 7 Additionally, the physical and
psychological harms likely visited upon women-especially young women
of lower socioeconomic status-if demand for eggs in support of 8this
avenue of research continues will undermine population health directly.1
On the other hand, visions of personalized medicine in the context of
biomarkers research carry a legitimate promise to radically improve overall
population health. At present, only about half of patients actually respond
positively to prescription medications.' 9 For the remainder, the drug is
either ineffective or toxic. 20 Adverse drug reactions are reportedly the
fourth leading cause of death in America. 2 1 Biomarkers (or the various
fields of scientific inquiry and corresponding technologies grouped under
that heading and described below) 22 are intended to enable healthcare
providers to make more informed decisions about how a patient should be
treated. In marked contrast to the inefficiencies of cloning-based stem cell
research and the clear-cut social welfare tradeoffs it carries, the efficiencies
to be gained from biomarkers research in terms of drug development costs,
times, and attrition rates are potentially tremendous. One study suggests
that twelve years of drug development time could shorten to three, and that
total cost reductions could approach 90% (from $800 million to $90
million).2 3

Transfer, 450 NATURE 497, 497 (2007).

16. Stephen Minger, Interspecies SCNT-Derived Human Embryos - A New Way
Forwardfor Regenerative Medicine, 2 REGENERATIVE MED. 103, 104 (2007).
17. See JESSE REYNOLDS ET AL., CENTER FOR GENETICS & Soc'Y, THE CALIFORNIA STEM
CELL PROGRAM AT ONE YEAR: A PROGRESS REPORT 11 (2006); Mita Giacomini, Francoise

Baylis & Jason Robert, Banking on It: Public Policy and the Ethics of Stem Cell Research
andDevelopment, 65 Soc. SCI. & MED. 1490, 1494-95 (2007).
18. F. Baylis & C. McLeod, The Stem Cell Debate Continues: The Buying and Selling of
Eggs for Research, 33 J. MED. ETHICS 726, 730 (2007).
19. Brian B. Spear, Margo Heath-Chiozzi & Jeffrey Huff, Clinical Application of
Pharmacogenetics,7 TRENDS MOLECULAR MED. 201, 201-02 (2001).

20.

Id. at 201,203.

21. See CTR. FOR DRUG EVAL. & RES., PREVENTABLE DRUG ADVERSE REACTIONS: A
Focus ON DRUG INTERACTIONS, http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/drugReactions/default.htm

(citing J. Lazarou, B. Pomeranz & P.N. Corey, Incidence of Adverse Drug Reactions in
Hospitalized Patients: A Meta-Analysis of Prospective Studies, 279 JAMA 1200, 1200-05
(1998)).
22.
23.

See infra Part 1.
JOHN A. VERNON & W. KEENER HUGHEN, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH

(NBER), WORKING PAPER No. W11875, THE FUTURE OF DRUG DEVELOPMENT: THE
ECONOMICS OF PHARMACOGENOMICS 14, 19-20 (2005), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/wl 1875. Others predict more modest, but nonetheless significant savings. Geoffrey
S. Ginsburg et al., Implications of Pharmacogenomicsfor Drug Development and Clinical
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It is this more promising avenue of scientific inquiry and vision of
molecular personalized medicine that will be under scrutiny here, although
stem cells will play the role of interloper, as will empirical observations
about the impact of intellectual property upon that scientific field.24 Part II
of the paper provides a detailed background of biomarkers research, the
regulatory picture, and the field's perceived shortcomings. Part III presents:
(a) the intellectual property dimension of biomarkers as it has been cast thus
far; (b) the contours of the broader debate around patenting "upstream"
research generally; (c) the data that we do possess about the impact such
patenting has upon research and development, and; (d) the data that we
lack, and why. Part IV aims to make the various claims put forth in Parts II
and III more concrete by examining a new initiative in the realm of cancer
research-a field in which the study of biomarkers and stem cells
converge-called the "Cancer Stem Cell Consortium" while also critiquing
one possible policy option, the proposed Genomics and Personalized
Medicine Act of 2008. Finally, Part V concludes by setting out a series of
questions for future research.
II. BIOMARKERS RESEARCH: CURRENT STATUS
Terminology is important not only for reasons of clarity, but also as a
measure of market dynamics. Researchers and firms operating within the
broad realm of biomarkers research may center their efforts around
molecular variations at the genomic, proteomic, or metabolic levels, or,
more ideally, the relationships between all three. But these same
researchers and firms often also participate in efforts to redefine lines of
scientific inquiry and re-brand business models to enhance investor interest
and generate goodwill. Pharmacogenomics has been supplanted by
biomarkers.2 5 Pharmaceutical companies are now "biopharmaceutical"
companies. 26 While these efforts are not necessarily disingenuous-they
may reflect real shifts in research agendas and business strategies-the
Practice, 165 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 2331, 2333 (2005) (noting that cost reductions could
amount up to $500 million per drug marketed); see also Monya Baker, In Biomarkers We
Trust?, 23 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 297, 298 (2005) (citing a report predicting savings of
forty-five percent by 2008 for projects favorably affected by biomarker technology). But cf
David F. Horrobin, Realism in Drug Discovery--Could Cassandra be Right?, 19 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 1099 (2001); Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, The Cost of
BiopharmaceuticalR&D: Is Biotech Different?, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 469
(2007).
24. To be precise, this paper will incorporate findings from the field of stem cell
research as a whole.
25. These two terms overlap, although the term "biomarkers" is broader in scope and
more en vogue currently.
26. Ronald A. Rader, (Re)defining Biopharmaceutical, 26 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY
743, 748 (2008).
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shifting terminology does reveal the utter uncertainty in the market at
present. Companies are jockeying for position in anticipation of a potential
reallocation of value between diagnostic and therapeutic interventions.2 7 As
elucidated below, this uncertainty coupled with a deficient regulatory
framework has not helped to develop promising biomarkers, save for a few
notable exceptions.
A. Biology, Language, & Markets
Biomarkers are the new cool kids on the block.2 8 The high degree of
interest that biomarkers presently command signals a positive move away
from the "one mutation/one function model" that has misguided molecular
biology research for some time29 and fueled much of the hype surrounding
the Human Genome Project. 30 Fundamentally understood, however,
biomarkers are not new. Simple physiological measurements (e.g. blood
pressure), imaging techniques (e.g. chest radiography), or laboratory
analytes (e.g. cholesterol) could be considered "classic" biomarkers. 31 But
while these classic indicators fit within the scope of the basic definition of a
biomarker, the term has risen to prominence in connection with efforts to
study the mechanism of diseases/disorders at the genetic, proteomic, and
metabolomic levels, and the impact of therapeutic interventions upon the
same.

Within this broad realm of biomarkers new and old, different typologies

27. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Will PharmacogenomicsAlter the Role of Patents in
Drug Development?, 5 PHARMACOGENOMICS 571, 571-72 (2002) ( "[T]here are limits to the
foresight and control of firms over how this technology will unfold and where its
commercial benefits will fall.").
28. See Baker, supra note 23, at 297 (describing biomarkers as the "sexy new word for
basic tools to probe biology"). Baker concludes by positing that "[tihe ultimate success of
biomarkers may only be realized when the focus shifts from finding them to understanding
their physiological relevance.... [o]nly when the word biomarker loses its buzz can it be
trusted." Id. at 304.
29. John H. Barton, Emerging Patent Issues in Genomic Diagnostics, 24 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 939, 940 (2006) (citing NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L
ACADEMIES, REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH 134 (2006).

30. See Timothy Caulfield, Popular Media, Biotechnology, and the "Cycle of Hype," 5
Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 213 (2005), available at http://www.law.uh.edu/hjhlp/
Issues%5CVoI_52%5CCaulfield.pdf.
31. Baker, supra note 23, at 297; Wilson et al., supra note 12, at 153.
32. Consistent with this, the proposed Genomics and PersonalizedMedicine Act of 2008
(See discussion infra Part III.) employs the following definition: "The term 'biomarker'
means an analyte found in or derived from a patient specimen that is objectively measured
and evaluated as an indicator of normal biologic processes, pathogenic processes, or

pharmacologic responses to a therapeutic intervention." H.R. 6498, 110th Cong. § 3(2)
(2008). Associated definitions, for instance, of a "pharmacogenetic test," and other
provisions of the bill evince a clear focus on molecular biology research. See H.R. 6498, §
3(7) passim.
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have emerged. In the name of personalized medicine (or, "individualized
medicine"), Wilson and colleagues distinguish amongst the following types
of biomarkers:
The practice of preemptive individualized medicine is predicated on the
discovery, development, and application of biomarkers in specific
clinical domains.
Preventive biomarkers prospectively identify
individuals at increased risk for developing disease. Diagnostic
biomarkers identify the presence of disease at the earliest stage, before
clinical manifestation. Prognostic biomarkers stratify risk of disease
progression in patients undergoing definitive therapy. Predictive
biomarkers identify patients most likely to respond to specific
interventions. Therapeutic biomarkers provide a quantifiable measure of
response to therapy in patients undergoing treatment. Finally, biomarkers
can be used to identify patients at risk for developing adverse reactions to
individual therapeutics.
This last type identified by Wilson et al. would be referred to as "toxicity
biomarkers" according to other typologies.34 Suffice it to say that the
biomarkers research field has many layers, and thus many different
potential pathways to commercial services and products.
Some products depend upon integration of several different types of
biomarkers whereas others do not, or do so only to a lesser extent.
Different business models or categories of companies and their
corresponding products can be branded along these lines. At one end of the
spectrum, there are firms whose business model is based entirely or
primarily upon "genetic testing" services. 35 These so-called "diagnostics"
(or "Dx") companies can go to market as soon 36 as they have phenotypegene association information and the necessary genetic sequencing
equipment in hand.37
33. Wilson et al., supra note 12, at 154 (emphasis added).
34. Baker, supra note 23, at 297 tbl.1 (offering another typology, comprised of disease
biomarkers, surrogate endpoints, efficacy or outcome biomarkers, mechanism biomarkers,
pharmacodynamic biomarkers, target biomarkers, toxicity biomarkers, and bridging or
translational biomarkers).
35. According to the Genomics and Personalized Medicine Act of 2008, the "term
'genetic test' means an analysis of human DNA, RNA, chromosomes, or metabolites, that
detects genotypes, mutations, or chromosomal changes." H.R. 6498 § 3(5).
36. There are certain regulatory requirements that laboratories performing genetic
testing services must, in theory, observe. Whether they actually do so will be discussed
briefly in Part I.C, infra, along with other deficiencies in the present regulatory framework.
37. The most (in)famous company in this mold is Myriad Genetics Inc. based in Salt
Lake City, Utah. As discussed in Part II, infra, Myriad holds nine United States patents
relating to two genes known as "BRCAI" and "BRCA2" that are associated with breast and
ovarian cancers. See E. RICHARD GOLD & JULIA CARBONE, INT'L EXPERT GROUP ON
BIOTECHNOLOGY, INNOVATION, & INTELLECTUAL PROP., MYRIAD GENETICS: IN THE EYE OF

THE POLICY STORM 9 (2008), http://www.theinnovationpartnership.org/data/ieg/documents/

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol18/iss2/4

8

2009]

Herder: Patents & (and) the Progress of Personalized Medicine: Biomarkers

Patents & The Progress of Personalized Medicine

A second brand of product or business model is described alternately as
"pharmacogenomics" or "pharmacogenetics," (depending on the scale of
the gene sequencing) although both have been colloquially dubbed "PGx."
Great fanfare has surrounded the notion of PGx products for years now for
precisely the same reason that has fueled the current excitement over neobiomarkers: the prospect of (more) personalized medicine. PGx research is,
in this sense, the father frame of biomarkers research and a slew of
pharmaceutical (or "Rx") corporations continue to claim to be actively
pursuing the area. Stratifying patient populations for the purpose of drug
therapy in the case of PGx, though, typically only seeks to incorporate
genetic information, In other words, PGx essentially "aims to identify the
genetic basis of variability in drug efficacy and safety. 38 Other types of
biomarkers, be they related to gene transcription, protein expression, or
metabolic pathways, are generally left out of the equation.3 9
The third brand, theragnostics (or "Tx"), purports to go further. "In
contrast to pharmacogenomics," Vural Ozdemir et al. explain, "theragnostic
tests focus not on a singular market set, such as genetic polymorphisms, but
rather on the integration of information from a diverse set of biomarkers
In other words, Tx
(e.g. genomic, proteomic, metabolomic). 4 °
technologies have the potential to harness significantly greater amounts of
biomarker information to the direct therapeutic benefit of patients.
None of these technologies, brands, or business models need be
considered mutually exclusive.41 Indeed, the few success stories to emerge
from the burgeoning biomarkers field have involved partnerships between
Dx and Rx, companies culminating in what have become known as
cases/TIPMyriadReport.pdf [hereinafter MYRIAD GENETICS]; see also discussion infra Part
III.
38. Vural Ozdemir et al., Shifting Emphasis from Pharmacogenomicsto Theragnostics,
24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 942, 942 (2006), available at http://www.genethics.ca/
personal/Theragnostics.NBT.pdf.
39. Admittedly, however, as betrayed by the definition of a "genetic test" used in the
Genomics and PersonalizedMedicine Act of 2008, genetic variations of interest can in some
cases be deduced using other kinds of information from the molecular environment, such as
enzyme metabolites. See H.R. 6498, § 3(5).
40. Ozdemir et al., supra note 38, at 942.
41. Indeed, the potential for overlap is strong as shown once again by the definition of
"pharmacogenetic test" included in the Genomics and PersonalizedMedicine Act of 2008:
The term "pharmacogenetic test" means a genetic test intended to identify
individual variations in DNA sequence related to drug absorption and disposition
(pharmacokinetics) or drug action (pharmacodynamics), including polymorphic
variation in the genes that encode the functions of transporters, receptors,
metabolizing enzymes, and other proteins, or other genomic variations, including
rearrangements, insertions, and deletions, or alterations in gene expression or
inactivation, that may be correlated with pharmacological function and
therapeutic response.
See H.R. 6498 § 3(7)(A).
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"companion diagnostics" (or "Dx/Rx").4 2

None of these collaborative
ventures have escaped controversy or setback, however.
Perhaps the best known is Roche's Herceptin, a monoclonal antibody
used to treat a subcategory of breast cancer patients shown to over-express a
protein associated with the oncogene "ERBB2. ' 43 For the 25 to 30% of
women with metastatic breast cancer falling into that category, Herceptin is
a highly effective treatment with annual sales for the biologic surpassing
$200 million. Yet concerns about the accuracy of different types of ERBB2
testing are emerging. 4 A second prominent example, Gleevec,4 5 works by
inhibiting a specific type of enzyme (a type of tyrosine kinase enzyme
known as "BCR-ABL") involved in causing chronic myelogenous
leukemia.4 6 Despite receiving regulatory approval, uptake in foreign
markets has been complicated by allegations of exorbitant pricing in South
Korea,47 as well as a Court decision finding one of Novartis' Gleevec
patents invalid due to a lack of efficacy in India.
Third, Amgen's
Vectibix, a colon cancer drug, received approval from the United States'
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) only to be turned down by European
regulators. 49 When Amgen submitted new data demonstrating higher
42. H.R. 6498 § 2 (listing several of these success stories as preamble findings).
43. This gene is sometimes referred to as HER2/neu instead of ERBB2. Compare
Malorye Allison, Is Personalized Medicine Finally Arriving? 26 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY
509, 516 (2008) [hereinafter Allison] with Barton, supra note 29, at 940 (2006).
44. The Food and Drug Administration has approved both an immunohisto-chemical test
and an in situ hybridization test to determine the status of HER2. Some clinical laboratories
are reportedly using genetic sequencing (quantitative "polymerase chain reaction" ("PCR"))
as an alternative. See Allison, supra note 43, at 516.
45. Novartis markets this drug as "Glivec" outside of the United States.
46. See Barton, supra note 29, at 940.
47. Limb Jae-un, Glivec Debate Poses Vital Issues, JOONGANG ILBO (Seoul), May 18,
2002,
at
6,
available at http://joongangdaily.joins.com/ data/pdf/2002/05/18/
2002051806.pdf.
48. Section 3(d) of the 2005 Indian Patents (Amendment) Act excludes from patentable
subject matter mere "new form[s] of a known substance which does not result in the
enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance or the mere discovery of any new
property or new use for a known substance or of the mere use of a known process, machine
or apparatus unless such known process results in a new product or employs at least one new
reactant." The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005; see also
USAIC, Patent Law Synopsis, http://www.usaindiachamber.org/images/Patent-lawsynopsys.pdf. The Indian Patent Office invoked this provision to deny Novartis' patent
application for a beta-crystal form of Gleevec. On August 6, 2007, the Chennai (Madras)
High Court dismissed Novartis's suit, upholding the Patent Office's rejection of the patent
claim under section 3(d), and deferring any assessment of the section's (in)consistency with
respect to TRIPs to the WTO. Novartis AG v. Union of India, Writ Petition Nos. 24759 &
24760 of 2006, 4 Madras L.J. 1153 (2007), available at http://judis.nic.in; see also ICTSD,
Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, vo. 11, no. 29, Sept. 5, 2007, "Novartis Patent
Challenge Dismissed in India," available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/07-09-05/
story3.htm.
49. Editorial, Looking Forward, Looking Back, 26 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 475
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efficacy for patients for whom chemotherapy failed, and who also tested
positive for epidermal growth factor receptor (EGFR), European officials
reversed their decision.50 But then the FDA responded in kind, withdrawing
its previous approval of the biologic.51
With so much uncertainty related to the scientific, intellectual property,
and regulatory aspects of biomarkers, neither the market's current volatility
nor the tenuous nature of the relationships amongst various players in the
field should be surprising.
B. Market Dynamics: Rx "- (Dx)

-

PGx / Tx --) ?

There is no consensus as to what business model or pathway works best
for commercializing technologies that incorporate biomarkers.
Some
products, like Herceptin, are the result of coordinated development amongst
First, the University of California, Los Angeles
multiple actors.52
("UCLA") secured a patent on the use of the oncogene ERBB2 to determine
whether patients over-expressed certain proteins. The large biotech firm
Genentech subsequently in-licensed the technology from the University.
Genentech then entered into several partnerships with other firms to
develop a set of diagnostic tests. Meanwhile, Roche, a member of "big
pharma," developed Herceptin, and bundled it together for sale with a
companion diagnostic.
In other instances, cooperation is lacking at the outset. Instead of
working with pharmaceutical companies, smaller diagnostic firms work
independently to identify biomarkers that can help assess when
pharmaceuticals that are already on the market will be more or less useful to
a group of patients. Once the firm finds the biomarker(s), it tries to sell the
technology to the drug-maker; in a sense, poaching a share of the
pharmaceuticals' original market. This is essentially what took place with
the cancer treatment, Gleevec. Genzyme, a large biotechnology firm,
obtained a license from UCLA over the BCR-ABL mutation, developed a
test that predicted resistance to Gleevec based upon that mutation, and then
sold the test to Novartis even though Gleevec had already received FDA
approval.
On paper, the cooperative Dx/Rx model would appear to make the most
sense. Drug firms typically have more financial resources, and thus have
superior access to expensive clinical trial data. Diagnostic companies have

(2008).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Barton, supra note 29, at 940 (describing this sequence of events and also suggesting
that another success story, ImClone's Erbitux, followed a pathway similar to Herceptin).
53. Id.
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greater expertise in developing diagnostics. Therefore, both parties have
assets that should be attractive to share. Why not make arrangements a
priori to do so? The reality is that Herceptin-esque Dx/Rx partnerships
remain "extremely rare.", 54 This bare fact is at the heart of the problem
framed in this paper. And the answer as to why non-cooperative models of
development are likely to persist under current conditions-yet fail more
often than not to result in a product like Gleevec-appears to be essentially
twofold. The first half of the answer is developed in the remaining sections
of Part II, whereas the second half is the focus of Part III.
To begin, distrust amongst market players works against greater
collaboration. Skepticism remains as to how receptive pharmaceutical
firms are to biomarkers." After all, the principal benefit that biomarkers
(and pharmacogenomics more specifically) offer-improved drug
penetration through patient segmentation-will reduce drug market size.56
Some have suggested that large pharmaceutical company participation in
the NIH's single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) consortium was less a
gesture of corporate goodwill, and more an attempt to sabotage
pharmacogenomics as a field because of its potential to undermine
blockbuster drugs. 57 On the other hand, many within the pharmaceutical
industry have explicitly acknowledged that the end of blockbuster drugs is
clear. 58 Because biomarkers can "rescue a product by providing a basis for
statistically significant benefits for a subcategory of patients in a clinical
trial," 59 many pharmaceutical firms are at least open to using biomarkers as
a back-pocket plan. 60 This would still seem less than ideal, though, not to
mention shortsighted assuming certain economic forecasts of remarkable
research and development savings through pharmacogenomics prove to be
accurate. 6'
For their part, many smaller biotech companies engaged in diagnostic or
other forms of biomarker-related development are content to go it alone
until they are in a position to approach a willing partner, as Genzyme-a
larger biotech company to which many smaller firms aspire-seemingly did
with Novartis. That this is a viable business strategy is the combined result
54. Allison, supra note 43, at 516.
55. See Bryn Williams-Jones & Vural Ozdemir, Challenges for Corporate Ethics in
Marketing Genetic Tests, 77 J. Bus. ETHics 33, 40-41 (2008) (noting it is not the case that
big pharma is "uniformly enthusiastic about pharmacogenomics").
56. Ozdemir et al., supranote 38, at 944.
57. Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 572.
58. See Rader, supra note 26, at 749 (distinguishing industry terminology and describing
recent challenges of the pharmaceutical industry).
59. Barton, supra note 29, at 940.
60. Allison, supra note 43, at 513; Ginsburg et al., supra note 23, at 2332.
61. Vernon & Hughen, supra note 23, at 17-20; and, Ginsburg et al., supra note 23, at
2333
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of a) the current regulatory framework and b) the intellectual property
dimension of biomarkers research. The problem framed throughout is that
the quality of the research inevitably suffers.
C. The RegulatoryDimension. In Brief62
As noted above, the regulatory framework as it applies to biomarker
technologies is highly uncertain at present. One or two regulatory bodiesthe FDA, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), or
both-could have jurisdiction over a given laboratory or firm depending on
the type of technology to be marketed as well as each regulatory body's
(evolving) understanding of its mandate. The simplest way to explain this
is to first focus upon entities providing genetic testing (or Dx) services and
to differentiate between the "analytic validity" and the "clinical validity" of
a genetic test. Kathy Hudson explains:
For a genetic test to be of high quality, it must be both analytically and
clinically valid. Analytic validity refers to a laboratory's ability to get the
correct answer reliably over time, for example, to detect a genetic
variation when it is present and not detect it when it is absent. Clinical
validity refers to whether a particular genetic 63variation is associated with
an individual's current or future health status.
Under the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988
(CLIA), a clinical laboratory 64 is prohibited from receiving human
specimens whether for genetic testing or any other kind of testing unless it
has been issued a certificate of compliance by CMS or another body acting
on its behalf.65 In this way, CMS ensures the analytic validity of all testing
in clinical laboratories, although there are different levels of oversight
imposed upon clinical laboratories depending upon the complexity of the
test(s) being provided.66
62. A full analysis of the current regulatory picture in relation to biomarkers research is
beyond the scope of this paper.
63. At Home DNA Tests: Marketing Scam or Medical Breakthrough:Hearing Before the
S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 109th Cong. 34 (2006) [hereinafter Hudson Testimony] (written
testimony of Kathy Hudson, Director, Genetics and Public Policy Center & Associate
Professor, Berman Bioethics Institute, Institute of Genetic Medicine & Department of
Pediatrics Johns Hopkins University) (emphasis in original), available at
http://www.dnapolicy.org/resources/Testimonyof KathyHudsonSenate Aging_7-2706.pdf.
64. CLIA defines a clinical laboratory as a "facility for the biological, microbiological,
serological, chemical, immuno-hematological, hematological, biophysical, cytological,
pathological, or other examination of materials derived from the human body for the purpose
of providing information for the diagnosis, prevention, or treatment of any disease or
impairment of, or the assessment of the health of, human beings." 42 U.S.C. § 263a(a).
65. 42 C.F.R. § 493.1.
66. See 42 C.F.R. § 493.17(a) (describing the categorization of testing according to
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Therein lies the problem with respect to ensuring the analytic validity of
clinical laboratories performing genetic testing. Unlike other types of
testing that have been deemed highly complex, 67 CMS has not sought to
create a "specialty area '68 in respect of genetic testing laboratories to
monitor the qualifications of laboratory personnel and/or require enrollment
in proficiency testing programs (i.e. "a method of externally validating the
level of a laboratory's performance").69 Some laboratories have voluntarily
enrolled in programs for proficiency testing. Many do not, however,
making it "difficult for health care providers or patients to distinguish
between those laboratories that are qualified to perform genetic testing and
those that are not.",70 Yet despite clear evidence of errors and misleading
statements by those purporting to provide genetic testing services, 7' CMS
has explicitly refused to create a specialty area and/or mandate proficiency
testing. 72
To complicate matters, ambiguity exists as to which regulatory body
carries the responsibility of ensuring that a genetic test is clinically valid in
the first place.73 Apparently, the FDA considers in vitro diagnostic tests to
be medical devices and thus subject to its jurisdiction.7 4 However, unless
such tests are sold to laboratories as "test kits"-in which case the
manufacturers must demonstrate the safety and efficacy of the kit-the
FDA has chosen to exercise its discretion and not enforce its regulatory
authority with respect to in vitro diagnostics.75 This stance has effectively
pushed the vast majority of clinical laboratories to utilize so-called "home
brew" tests, i.e. tests developed in-house for which no FDA review is
sought or required.76
complexity).
67. CMS has created specialty areas for many types of tests, including Microbiology,
Diagnostic Immunology, and Chemistry. Hudson Testimony, supra note 63, at 35.
68. Specialty areas are essentially a bureaucratic structure or mechanism used by CMS
as a way of implementing and enforcing compliance by clinical laboratories engaged in a
particular kind of testing with more specific (and stringent) requirements. See Hudson
Testimony, supra note 63, at 35.
69. Id. at 35-36.
70. Id.at 36.
71. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NUTRIGENETIC TESTING: TESTS PURCHASED
FROM FOUR WEB SITES MISLEAD CONSUMERS 5-7 (July 27, 2006), http://www.gao.gov/

new.items/d06977t.pdf.
72. See Letter from Dennis G. Smith, Dir., Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to
Kathy Hudson (Aug. 15, 2007, http://www.dnapolicy.org/resources/CMSresponse8.15.07.
pdf.
73. Hudson Testimony, supranote 63, at 37.
74. See Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539, 575
(1976).
75. PCAST, supra note 3, at 37.
76. Wilson et al., supra note 12, at 153; see also PCAST, supra note 3, at 39 ("Based on
the FDA's longstanding decision to exercise enforcement discretion with respect to [home-
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The administrative decisions adhered to by CMS to not mandate
proficiency testing to better ensure analytic validity and the FDA to
exercise its discretion not to review home-brew tests have, in turn,
significantly altered the commercial landscape. Historically, for example,
firms with diagnostic technologies followed a business model that sought
FDA approval in any event, exploiting the FDA's seal of approval to
market "test kits" to clinical laboratories.77 Now a new paradigm exists.
Many firms have laboratories of their own. In select cases, firms will seek
CLIA certification from CMS for their laboratory facilities for the same
reason that they formerly sought FDA approval: to enhance credibility and
thus value of their product in the marketplace. But, in most cases, firms
forgo CLIA certification as well as FDA approval in order to save money
and attempt to commercialize technology faster.7 8 Indeed, almost all of the
1,000 plus genetic tests that are commercially available are marketed as
home-brews. 79
Of course, this picture is subject to change or becomes more complex
when other technologies are paired with diagnostics. For example, the FDA
appears to be planning to expand its authority "to a subset of home-brew
molecular tests termed in vitro diagnostic multivariate index assays
(IVDMIAs), which measure multiple analytes analyzed with algorithms or
software programs., 80 The reason for this proposed oversight is that the
algorithms used in IVDMIAs are "often proprietary, resulting in an inability
of physicians to interpret the results directly."8 1 On the other hand,
pharmacogenomic technologies (at least those that involve drugs to be
marketed with a companion diagnostic) presumably fit within the existing
82
definition of a "drug" or a "device" in the Food,Drug and Cosmetic Act,
and are thus subject to FDA review both pre- and post-market entry. In
fact, the FDA has spelled out its approach to pharmacogenomic data during
the regulatory process, 83 and produced a draft concept paper on drug-

brew tests], many developers have already launched or have planned to implement new
IVDMIA diagnostic tests as [home-brew tests] rather than as manufactured kits. Thus, a
number of business plans were based on a path to market via laboratory-based
implementation and CLIA regulation, rather than the path of a PMA submission to the FDA,
which is perceived to be riskier and more costly.").
77. Wilson et al., supra note 12, at 155.
78. Id. at 155.
79. Id.at 153.
80. Id.at 154. FDA, DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, CLINICAL LABORATORIES, AND
FDA

STAFF:

IN

VITRO

DIAGNOSTIC

MULTIVARIATE

http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/oivd/guidance/1610.pdf.
81. Wilson et al., supra note 12, at 154.
82. See, respectively, 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)-(h) (2006).
83. FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: PHARMACOGENOMIC
availableat http://www.fda.gov/cber/gdlns/pharmdtasub.pdf.
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diagnostic co-development. 4
Even if the FDA extends its jurisdiction to IVDMIAs, a change that
some would presumably welcome while others suggest would be misguided
unless potential overlap with CLIA requirements and other ambiguities are
first resolved,85 a fundamental problem remains.
The majority of
biomarkers-related research that presently exists and which is being
transacted over by research institutions and commercial firms or sold
directly to healthcare providers and consumers appears to be of poor
quality. Putting aside the issue of whether clinical laboratories can actually
provide accurate test results (i.e. ensure analytic validity), the marketplace
and healthcare sector are still confronted with a mass of biomarker data, the
clinical utility of which is uncertain at best. Apart from the sheer
complexity of the science, the reason can be parsed into two failures. First,
companies have failed to rigorously "validate" biomarkers. That is, the
companies did not wait to find statistically robust correlations between a
particular biomarker and a specific disease state before embarking upon
commercialization. 86 Secondly, firms have failed to "qualify" biomarkers
such that the relationships, if any, that a given biomarker has with clinical
endpoints remain unknown. 7 According to Wilson and colleagues, it is this
dual failure to generate "definitive analytical validation and clinical
qualification that contributes to the relatively slow integration of molecular
biomarkers into patient management paradigms. 8 8
84.

FDA, DRUG-DIAGNOSTIC CO-DEVELOPMENT CONCEPT PAPER (DRAFT)

(2005),

available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/genomics/pharmacoconceptfn.pdf.
85. PCAST, for instance, has complained that the FDA's release of draft guidance with
respect to IVDMIAs creates a series of problems for the industry that need to be addressed:
The IVDMIA draft guidance changed the IVDMIA development picture in two
key respects. First, it implied a substantially increased overall regulatory burden.
The increase would arise largely from hurdles imposed by FDA with respect to
clinical efficacy such as new requirements for prospective clinical trials, but also
in part from the imposition by FDA of quality system requirements for test
manufacture that appeared to be duplicative of regulations already imposed on
those labs performing LDTs under CLIA. Second, residual ambiguity in the
FDA's definitions of an IVDMIA and of risk left considerable uncertainty about
the agency's likely response to specific new products in or planned for
development. For developers, the expected effect of these changes was increased
cost, time, and risk for bringing a new product to market, effectively raising the
hurdle for market access and putting in question the viability of the entire sector
as a target for investment.
PCAST, supranote 3, at 39.
86. This occurs because companies using home-brews often do not pre-defme
performance metrics prior to carrying out studies comparing a disease population and a
control population, and because there is an absence of assay performance standards across
laboratories leading to problems of clinical reproducibility. Wilson et al., supra note 12, at
154.
87. Id.See generally Baker, supra note 23, at 301.
88. Wilson et al., supranote 12, at 155.
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The current regulatory framework and business models taking advantage
of the same are all-together too easy to blame for this situation: "companies
think their job is done when they find differences in a control set versus a
disease set, and neglect to integrate that information with relevant
biology., 89 To characterize this solely as a regulatory issue would,
however, be facile. The present regulatory framework is, rather, only half
of the problem for it is current intellectual property law standards and
practices (primarily patent law standards and practices) that work to
legitimate this business model, or at least make it temporarily viable.
Worse, the lens of the debate around patenting early stage research appears
to divert attention away from this quality-based concern.
III. THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DIMENSION:
CHARTING THE DISCOURSE

The paucity of deals between smaller biomarker firms and larger
(bio)pharmaceutical entities and the attendant consequences upon the
quality of the science, much less the prospect of personalized medicine,
have failed to generate much substantive discussion amongst those who
study the impact and utilization of patent rights. 90 Experts have instead
devoted their energies to predicting how the Supreme Court's (non)decision
in Metabolite Laboratories,Inc. v. LaboratoryCorp. ofAmerica Holdings9 l
will be received, extrapolating lessons from the now-infamous saga of the

89. Baker, supra note 23, at 299 (quoting a regulatory official complaining that a "drug
should treat a disease, not a biomarker").
90. One notable commentator, Rebecca Eisenberg, predicted that the law may at some
point require coordinated development and marketing of a pharmacogenomic test along with
the therapeutic product. The question that Eisenberg leaves unanswered is how. See
Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 572. For his part, John Barton suggested that parties holding
patents over genetic sequences could be required to grant reasonable-royalty licenses to
entities wishing to utilize the sequences as part of a micro-array or another
pharmacogenomic device. However, it is not clear that this proposal would engender the
kinds of inter-institutional relationships that are needed to increase biomarkers qualification
so much as to do away with a certain amount of patent litigation. See Barton, supra note 29,
at 941 (arguing that such licenses potentially represent an acceptable compromise from the
point of view of patent-holders given the Supreme Court's recent ruling that injunctions will
no longer be automatically granted in instances of alleged patent infringement). See eBay
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
91. Lab. Corp. of Am. v. Metabolite Lab., Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006). Although the
Supreme Court ultimately denied certiorari in LabCorp, Justice Breyer's dissent, which
openly questioned the patentability of a "basic science relationship" between bodily protein
levels and vitamin B deficiency, has subsequently gained a little traction, especially at the
Board of Patent Appeals. Given that patents similar to the one at issue in LabCorp are
commonplace in the realm of biomarkers, commentators have hypothesized about the
possible impact of this decision upon the field. See Barton, supra note 29; Cynthia Ho,
Lessons from Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories,Inc., 23
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 463 (2007).
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Utah-based diagnostic company, Myriad Genetics, Inc.,92 or sounding
cautions about harms of medical process patents to physicians at the pointof-patient care.9 3
Each of these aspects is of course pertinent to biomarkers research. If the
skepticism expressed in Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion in LabCorp is
translated into binding law, an entire species of biomarker firms is likely
dead in the water. 94 Assuming that a measure of uncertainty persists,
Myriad is an informative precedent for what can go wrong when a
diagnostic firm exercises (or appears to exercise) its exclusive patent rights
over genetic sequences and related methods of testing.95 With the possible
exception of concerns about undermining quality of treatment at point-ofpatient care, these concerns are of a very familiar tone: they raise hallmark
questions about patentability standards, the effect of elevated patent counts,
and rogue actors.
But therein lies a problem for which scholars are at least partially to
blame. These frames, which scholars helped create, have shifted attention
away from the impact of patents upon the overall quality of biomarkers
research. 96 Commentators have, by and large, focused on discrete points or
issues that arise in the commercialization process in relative isolation from
one another, rather than the gamut of relationships and corresponding
decision-making needed to develop biomarkers of proven clinical utility.
Demonstrating these framing effects requires a detailed account of the
patent debate as it has evolved over time, the data that has been collected to
date, the evidence we are missing, and why.

92. See Ozdemir et al., supra note 38, at 943; Williams-Jones & Ozdemir, supra note 55,
at 36.
93. Aaron S. Kesselheim & Michelle M. Mello, Medical-Process Patents Monopolizing the Delivery of Health Care, 355 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2036 (2006); see also
Ozdemir et al., supra note 38, at 945; Williams-Jones & Ozdemir, supra note 55.
94. Justice Breyer's opinion continues to generate judicial debate. For example, in
Prometheus Laboratories., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services, Civil No. 04cv1200 JAH
(RBB), 2008 WL 878910, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008), the District Court found Justice
Breyer's reasoning in LabCorp persuasive. The District Court found the claims at issue in
Prometheus, which focused on a method of "optimizing therapeutic efficacy" by first
administering a particular drug to a subject and then using the subject's metabolite level to
adjust future drug doses, invalid for want of patentable subject matter. The decision is
presently under appeal. In contrast to Prometheus, Justice Rader was highly critical of
Justice Breyer's logic in his dissenting opinion in In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1014-15 (Fed.
Cir. 2008).
95. See Gold & Carbone, supra note 37, for an incredibly in-depth account of this saga
as it played out in several jurisdictions, which debunks a number of false beliefs about
Myriad's motivations and actions.
96. Again, the quality of the research does not extend to quality at point-of-patient care,
which certain scholars have discussed. See Kesselheim & Mello, supra note 93.

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol18/iss2/4

18

2009]

Herder: Patents & (and) the Progress of Personalized Medicine: Biomarkers
Patents & The Progress of Personalized Medicine
A. Before Myriad, Long Before LabCorp

Upward and upstream-this is where patent counts and patentable
subject matter have, in general, gone. There are examples of patenting
compositions of matter derived from the human body such as adrenaline
dating back to the early twentieth century,97 and of academic institutions
pursuing, to the health detriment of some, exclusive rights over inventions
made with public funds.98 Unquestionably, though, the overall scope of
patentable subject matter has opened up considerably following the
Supreme Court's decision in Diamond v. Chakrabartyto extend patentable
subject matter to "anything under the sun made by man," including
genetically-modified organisms. 99 And the last thirty to forty years have
been witness to an incredible rise in patent application filings, patent grants,
licensing deals, sponsored research agreements, and spin-off companies,
particularly at publicly funded research institutions'0 0
Accordingly,
scholars went about studying these changes, and their impact upon
dissemination of knowledge at the point where a decision to try to
commercialize is initially made, as signaled by filing a patent application,
entering into a research or licensing agreement with an existing company,
or creating a start-up company.
The issue of patentable subject matter continues to stir academic debate
every so often, typically in response to some morally contentious scientific
achievement such as the derivation of human embryonic stem cells, the
creation of animal-human chimeras or hybrids, or the development of a
synthetic micro-organism. 01 In contrast, the Supreme Court, essentially,
has treated patentable subject matter as a non-issue since the Chakrabarty
and Diamond v. Diehr 0 2 decisions in the early 1980s. Whether LabCorp
foreshadows real change remains speculative.
Meanwhile, the increase in upstream patenting has spurred controversy
that has led to actual policy reforms of one kind. 0 3 Initially, the Bayh-Dole
Act was widely credited with boosting commercialization of publicly
97. See Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff'd in
part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912).
98. See Rima D. Apple, Patenting University Research: Harry Steenbock and the
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, 80 Isis 375 (1989).
99. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980), quoting S. Rep. No. 82-1979, at
5 (1952); H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952).
100. See, e.g., David C. Mowery et al., The Growth of Patentingand Licensing by U.S.
Universities: An Assessment of the Effects of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 30 RES. POL'Y 99

(2001).
101.

For a good discussion of some

of these morally controversial

patented

technologies, see Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and

Biotechnology in PatentLaw, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 469 (2003).
102. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
103. See infra Part III.B.
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funded research.10 4 However, the empirical evidence that scholars were
later able to collect provided a very different picture. To begin, the rise in
patenting at academic institutions, in fact, extends back to the early 1970sprior to the enactment of this legislation-and is attributable to a
combination of factors' 0 5 Second, it remains unclear as to whether these
changes actually facilitate commercialization (understood as the translation
of basic scientific discoveries into marketable products), or simply
encourage more "commercialization deals" (defined as any agreement
between a university and private company). 0 6 In fact, Bayh-Dole itself
seems to have been enacted on the strength of a similar misunderstanding
by legislators of the data then available. 10 7 Third, notwithstanding the fact
that the number of deals has increased exponentially post-Bayh-Dole,
traditional channels of knowledge transfer (e.g. publications, conference
presentations, and graduating students) continue to dwarf knowledge
transferred through the full spectrum of commercialization deals (e.g.
licenses, sponsored research agreements, material transfer agreements, joint

104. Evidently, its main sponsors continue to champion the legislation as having that
effect to emerging economies. For a critical analysis of that type of claim, see Anthony D.
So et al., Is Bayh-Dole Goodfor Developing Countries? Lessons from the US Experience, 6

PLoS BIOLOGY 2078, 2078 (2008).

105. These include an increase in United States' government funding for research
generally that extended back to the former Soviet Union's launch of Sputnik into outer
space, the onset of commercial biotechnology spelled by Stanley Cohen and Herbert Boyer's
invention of recombinant DNA technology. JENNIFER WASHBURN, UNIVERSITY, INC.: THE
CORPORATE CORRUPTION OF HIGHER EDUCATION

44, 49-50 (2004). There was also a broader

shift in favor of 'stronger' intellectual property rights, of which Bayh-Dole is only one part.
Mowery et al., supra note 100, at 103. Other elements of this shift were the Supreme
Court's decision to extend patentable subject matter to genetically-modified organisms in
Chakrabarty, the creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as a specialized
tribunal for intellectual property disputes, and the promulgation of a variety of international
treaties. See id. The influence of a community of commercially-minded technology
managers that began to coalesce around one bureaucrat, Norman Latker, and his efforts to
facilitate commercialization of publicly funded research, also should not be discounted as an
important factor in this broad shift. See WASHBURN, supra note 105, at 65-69.

106.

Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.

& ENT. L.J. 611, 622-623 (2008).
107. Proponents of Bayh-Dole were seemingly unaware of the potential distinction
between the two. They argued that the 28,000 - 30,000 publicly funded inventions then
sitting idle in public laboratories was proof enough that title should be divested from the
federal government in order for commercialization-both translational and transactional-to
increase. The truth, however, was that the majority (63%) of those inventions could have
been patented by industry according to the terms attached to Department of Defense funding.
But industry chose not to do so, thus explaining why only 1% of inventions from that same
pool were licensed. In other words, the inventions sat idle not because of the government
patent rights, but because they had already been deemed uninteresting from a commercial
point of view. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development:
Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-SponsoredResearch, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663,
1702 (1996).
MEDIA
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ventures, and start-up companies). °8 Industry also claims to covet
knowledge gained through traditional channels
more than knowledge
09
gained through patent deals, licenses, etc.'
With the impetus for-and impact of-Bayh-Dole so muddied by
confounding data and other contextual factors, researchers began to sharpen
their focus upon what is arguably the law's one unequivocal legacy:
technology transfer offices (TTOs). A few TTOs pre-date Bayh-Dole,
indeed they helped push for the legislation, but 122 new offices were
established during the "boom years" of 1983 to 1999." This machinery,
these "brokers on the boundary" of academia and industry,"' are the
principal decision-makers about what, when, and where to patent, as well as
with whom and how to share." 2 Indeed, that is how TTO performance is
measured: by how many patent applications they file, how may patents they
obtain, how many licensing agreements they enter into,
whether those
13
forth."
so
and
non-exclusive,
versus
exclusive
are
licenses
Occasionally, some have heralded TTO decision-making. The joint
decision of Stanford University and the University of California to license
the Cohen-Boyer recombinant DNA technology-non-exclusively to any
and all interested parties for a nominal fee-is widely credited with
enabling a new era of molecular biology, and spawning the commercial
biotech sector." 4 But, in a second wave of research, scholars began to
detect that research tools may not be shared at optimal levels, or that
exclusive licenses were capable of precipitating pricing abuses. To critics,
108. Even at institutions such as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT),
where entrepreneurialism and science were wed long before most other academic research
institutions in the United States, patents were estimated to account "for as little as 7% of the
knowledge that was transferred from [MIT] labs to industry." See Ajay Agrawal & Rebecca
Henderson, Putting Patents in Context: Exploring Knowledge Transferfrom MIT, 48 MGMT.
Sci. 44, 45 (2002). This is consistent with another finding by Cohen "that only about 11% of
the information obtained from university research was transferred through patents." See id
at 46 (citing Wesley M. Cohen et al., Industry and the Academy: Uneasy Partners in the
Cause of Technological Advance, in CHALLENGES TO RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES 171, 177

(Roger G. Noll ed., 1998).
109. See id.; Wesley M. Cohen et al., Links and Impacts: The Influence of Public
Research on IndustrialR&D, 48 MGMT. SCI. 1, 16 (2002).
110.

To be precise, 27 TTOs existed before 1980.

Ass'N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS,

AUTM U.S. LICENSING SURVEY: FY 2005, SURVEY SUMMARY 17 (Dana Bostrom & Robert
Tieckelmann
eds.,
2007),
available
at
http://www.autm.net/events/File/
USLS_05Final(1).pdf [hereinafter AUTM SURVEY].
111. Donald Fisher & Janet Atkinson-Grosjean, Brokers on the Boundary: AcademicIndustry Liaison in CanadianUniversities,44 HIGHER EDUC. 449, 449450 (2002).
112. Of course, TTOs report to their institutions' administrations. But they have shown
to be remarkably adept at safeguarding their autonomy. See id. at 453.
113. See, e.g, AUTM SURVEY, supra note 110.
114. Sally Smith Hughes, Making Dollars out of DNA: The First Major Patent in
Biotechnology and the Commercialization of Molecular Biology, 1974-1980, 92 Isis 541,
572 (2001).
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what the deal was seemingly mattered less to TTOs than getting the deal
done.' 15 And policy-folk began to agitate.
B. Stories & (Policy)Storms
The second wave of scholarly research galvanized around two or three
overlapping narratives: Myriad, research tools, and the "tragedy of the
anticommons."' 116 In the early 1990s several groups of researchers were
competing to discover potential genetic determinants of breast and ovarian
They collaborated, creating a research consortium and
cancer.
accompanying shared database of genomic information, but the group at the
University of Utah led by Mark Skolnick was the first to identify and patent
a gene ("BRCAI") associated with breast and ovarian cancer. 117 In turn,
the University's TTO spun-off Myriad Genetics Inc., with an exclusive
license to BRCA1.118 On the eve of the publication of a second genetic
sequence associated with breast and ovarian cancers ("BRCA2") by a group
in the United Kingdom, Skolnick's outfit surreptitiously filed a patent
application over the same.11 9 Controversy ensued, but Myriad eventually
secured the rights to BRCA2 as well. In total, Myriad would hold nine
United States patents over the BRCA1/2 genes and related methods of
diagnosis,
as well as similar patents in Canada, Europe, Australia, and
0
Japan.

12

While Myriad's intentions about suing institutions engaged in research
on BRCA1/2 may have been misunderstood, the company did deliver
"cease-and-desist" letters to a number of healthcare providers (in the United
States as well as abroad) ordering them not to perform testing for BRCA1/2
or else risk liability for patent infringement. 2 1 Its business model was to
become the sole provider of the full sequencing test, and at a significantly
more expensive price than others had previously charged (reportedly $3,600
instead of $1,200).122 Clinics and physicians especially were not pleased
115. To be clear, TTOs did pay attention to what the deal was. The criticism was rather
that the terms of the deal usually favored the interests of the private sector party instead of
academic researchers. In other words, 'getting the deal done' entailed agreeing to certain
conditions that made sharing research findings and tools more onerous.
116. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698 (1998) [hereinafter Heller &
Eisenberg, The Anticommons].
117. Gold & Carbone, supra note 37, at 7-8.
118.

See

NAT'L RESEARCH

COUNCIL,

REAPING

THE BENEFITS OF

GENOMIC AND

62-63 (2006) [hereinafter NRC, REAPING THE BENEFITS].
119. Gold & Carbone, supra note 37, at 9.
120. Id.
at 6, 9.
at 10,24.
121. Id.
122. The details of Myriad's actions in Canada are provided in E. Richard Gold, From
Theory to Practice:Health Care and the Patent System, HEALTH L. J. (Special Edition) 21,
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol18/iss2/4
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with Myriad's stance yet service providers opted not to challenge
the
1 23
litigation.
costly
and
protracted
fearing
presumably
claims,
company's
During the same period, there were grumblings amongst the research
community that "research tool[s]' ' 124 were becoming increasingly difficult

to access due to the terms and conditions attached to their use by TTOs
and/or the time taken to negotiate the same. 125 In 1998, the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) established a working group to investigate the
issue, which validated the research community's complaint. 126 The working
group concluded that a multi-layered response was warranted; including
issuing guidelines for funding recipients, drafting a model material transfer
agreement, and creating a forum for further discussion amongst the research
community. 127
The NIH responded in kind by releasing a set of principles and
guidelines to help "ensure that unique research resources... are made
available to the scientific research community."' 128 Specifically, the
guidelines stated that research tools need not always be patented, and in the
event that they were, exclusive licenses should be avoided except when an
exclusive license is deemed necessary to ensure further development of the
tool.1 29 In those exceptional cases, the institution (through its TTO) should
seek to limit the exclusive license to the particular commercial field-of-use
and retain the rights to use and distribute the tool for use in other
research. 30 Compliance with the guidelines was not formally a condition
of funding, however, the guidelines were said to express NIH's
expectations. 131
Many thought the type of patent "hold-up" or "blocking"' 132 witnessed
35 (2003).
123. Id. at 35-36. This is true in the U.S. but was a much more forceful reaction in
Canada and Europe. Gold & Carbone, supra note 37, at 6.
124.
TOOLS

NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE NIH WORKING GROUP ON RESEARCH
WORKING GROUP], available at http://www.nih.gov/

1, 3 (1998) [hereinafter NIH

news/researchtools/. Research tools were defined as "the full range of resources that
scientists use in the laboratory," including "cell lines, monoclonal antibodies, reagents,
animal models, growth factors, combinatorial chemistry libraries, drugs and drug targets,
clones and cloning tools (such as PCR), methods, laboratory equipment and machines,
databases and computer software." Id.
125. Id.at 2.
126. Id. "Many scientists and institutions involved in biomedical research are frustrated
by growing difficulties and delays in negotiating the terms of access to research tools." Id.
127. Id.at 3.
128. Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research Grants and Contracts on
Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources: Request for Comments, 64
Fed. Reg. 28,205, 28,207 (May 25, 1999) [hereinafter NIH Research Resources].
129. Id. at 28,208.
130. Id.
131. Id. at28,205.
132. That is,situations where the individual patent-holders simply refuse to license
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with Myriad, or inefficient research tool sharing, might represent only the
tip of the iceberg. As indicated above, whether primarily attributable to
Bayh-Dole or not, patenting by academic institutions had increased
dramatically through the 1980s and 1990s.1 33 Patent "thickets" were seen

as emerging in the realm of basic science; to lawfully pursue a chosen
avenue of research multiple licenses would have to be negotiated, and
multiple royalties paid.1 34 In their now (in)famous 1998 article in Science,
Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg labeled this situation the "tragedy of
the anticommons."' 135 The authors hypothesized that the sheer proliferation
of patent rights associated with upstream research inputs, particularly DNA
sequences, would substantially increase "transaction costs" and imperil
progress in biomedical research. In their view, there were structural
impediments to any private ordering, contract-based solution. Such
impediments include the heterogeneous-if not conflicting interests-of the
two principal parties to any licensing negotiation (academic TTOs and
private firms), the difficulty of accurately valuating upstream technologies,
136
and the cognitive biases of researchers in favor of their own research.
The anticommons hypothesis and Myriad story showed to have
considerable rhetorical force, kick-starting policy-making exercises in the
United States and several other countries.1 3 7 Others meanwhile wondered
whether patent blocking, the anticommons, and broader perceived cultural
changes in the academic research environment (observable in part through
TTO practices), would be borne out through empirical study.
C. The EmpiricalData
Overall, the empirical evidence amassed thus far is mixed. On one hand,
in terms of genetic tests, the evidence shows a bona fide patent blocking
problem. One study found that 30% of clinical laboratories reported not
developing or abandoning testing for a gene associated with
haemochromatosis once the patent issued. 13 8 Another investigation of over
necessary inventions to researchers or healthcare providers (perhaps because the invention is
already exclusively licensed to someone else) or require license fees that are prohibitively
expensive.
133. See Mowery et al., supranote 100.
134. See Carl Shapiro, Navigatingthe Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, PatentPools, and
StandardSetting, in 1 INNOVATION POL'Y & THE ECON. 119 (Adam B. Jaffe et al., eds.,
2001), availableat http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/thicket.pdf.
135. See Heller & Eisenberg, The Anticommons, supra note 116.
136. See id.
137. Timothy Caulfield et al., Evidence and Anecdotes: An Analysis of Human Gene
Patenting Controversies, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1091, 1093 (2006) [hereinafter
Caulfield et al., Evidence andAnecdotes].
138. Jon F. Merz et al., Industry Opposes Genomic Legislation, 20 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 657 (2002).
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100 laboratories found that 25% of respondents discontinued testing
because of an existing patent or license. 39 Although the BRCA1/2 was the
most commonly identified test, eleven other genetic tests ceased to be
offered because of the existence of patent rights.1 40 In terms of research
use, 53% of respondents halted development of a new clinical test due to a
patent or license. 14
Some instances of healthcare service providers
continuing to conduct testing in the face of patent claims have been
reported, but numerous other
providers-fearing expensive litigation-have
42
stopped testing outright. 1
Evidence of an anticommons is less cogent. Some support for Heller and
Eisenberg's theory can be derived from a study that examined a pool of 169
"patent-paper pairs"-each pair being tied to a single piece of scientific
research or particular scientific achievement. According to the authors,
anticommons theory would predict that "[r]elative to the expected citation
pattern for publications with a given quality level.., the citation rate to a
scientific publication should fall after formal [intellectual property] rights
associated with that publication are granted."'143 The authors found what
they deemed to be a "modest" anticommons effect: "the citation rate after
the patent grant declined by between 9 and 17%," with the decline
becoming "more pronounced with the number of years elapsed since the
date of the patent grant, and is particularly salient for articles authored by
researchers with public sector affiliations."' 44 Subsequent research using
the same patent-pair methodology but encompassing a larger and more
diverse sample of publications in the realm of human genetics, determined
that the "negative impact of patent grants on future public knowledge
production.., was about 5%"--an effect that is exacerbated
when the
145
genes in question are linked closely to human disease.
139. Mildred K. Cho et al., Effects of Patents and Licenses on the Provision of Clinical
Genetic Testing Services, 5 J.MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS 3, 5 (2003).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142.

NRC, REAPING THE BENEFITS, supra note 118, at 68 citing Cho et al., supra note

139, at 5 and Michelle R. Henry et al., DNA Patentingand Licensing, 297 Sc. 1279, 1297
(2002).
143. Scott Stem & Fiona Murray, Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder the
Free Flow of Scientific Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the Anti-Commons Hypothesis
(Abstract) (Nat'l. Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. WI 1465, 2005).
144. Id.
145. Kenneth G. Huang & Fiona E. Murray, Does Patent Strategy Shape the Long-Run
Supply of Public Knowledge? Evidence from Human Genetics, ACADEM. OF MGMT. J.
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 40, 42, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1249522).
Notably, the fact that the impact was exacerbated when the genes in question were more
closely linked to a particular human disease, and that the patents over the same were more
likely to be the subject of aggressive enforcement tactics led the researchers to conclude that
the "negative effect of patents lies at the heart of the fight to improve human health." Id. at
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However, other work led by John Walsh suggests that researchers,
specifically researchers working in academia, may be largely immune to
patent blocking or anticommons issues. In 2003, Walsh, Ahish Arora, and
Wesley Cohen presented data from the United States indicating that barriers
to access imposed by patents are often avoided by adopting "working
solutions," such as going offshore, inventing around the patent, licensing,
using public databases and research tools, or simply using the invention
without obtaining permission (i.e. infringing the patent). 146 A larger survey
published in 2005 yielded similar findings, as did equivalent studies in
other jurisdictions. 147 Walsh's findings do point to a problem with obtaining
148
which some argue ought not be classified as a nonresearch materials,
49
1
patent issue.
David Adelman and Kathryn DeAngelis offer yet another criticism of
anticommons theory as it has come to be propounded. 5 ° Their main point
43.
146.

John P. Walsh et al., Working Through the Patent Problem, 299 Sci. 1021, 1021

(2003).
147.

John P. Walsh et al., View from the Bench: Patents and Material Transfers, 309

ScI. 2002, 2002 (2005);

JOSEPH STRAUS ET AL., EMPIRICAL SURVEY ON GENETIC INVENTIONS

AND PATENT LAW (presented at the OECD Expert Workshop on Genetic Inventions,
Intellectual Property Rights and Licensing Practices 2002); DIANNE NICOL & JANE NIELSEN,
PATENTS AND MEDICAL BIOTECHNOLOGY: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF ISSUES FACING THE

AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRY (Centre for Law and Genetics, Occasional Paper No. 6, 2003).
148. Both Walsh-led studies document increasing difficulties with respect to sharing
tangible research materials and tools that are strictly speaking not caused by patent rights,
but rather the terms, conditions, and associated negotiating process of concluding material
transfer agreements (MTAs) to govern materials exchange. Cf Victor Rodriguez et al., Do
Material Transfer Agreements Affect the Choice of Research Agendas? The Case of
Biotechnology in Belgium, 71 SCIENTOMETRICS 239, 261 (2007) (unable to "conclude that
agreements signed by industry and government affect research agenda setting in academia");
Victor Rodriguez et al., Material Transfer Agreements and Collaborative Publication
Activity: The Case of a Biotechnology Network 16 RES. EVALUATION 123, 123 (2007)
(finding that "material transfer agreements might not have interfered in such a way to limit
co-publication activity of research organi[z]ations in the network" under the study).
149. As Matthew Herder and Richard Gold explain:
MTAs typically accord to the material providers reach-through rights to IP
developed by the recipient. To the extent that bargaining breakdown is tied to
those terms, then, access is properly characteri[z]ed as an IP issue. More
fundamentally, it is highly artificial to separate these two forms - IP and physical
property - of property protection. They are instead better understood as
interacting with and reinforcing one another: MTAs, as a general rule, attach
confidentiality obligations and use restrictions, in large part, for the purpose of
safeguarding the ability of material providers (and/or their corresponding
sponsors) to file subsequent patent applications.
MATTHEW HERDER & RICHARD GOLD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY:
HEALTH AND INDUSTRY 15 (OECD INTERNATIONAL FUTURES PROJECT ON 'THE BIOECONOMY
TO 2030: DESIGNING A POLICY AGENDA,' 2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/16/9/40181372.pdf.
150. The authors note that Heller and Eisenberg were careful to tailor their theory to
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is that elevated patent counts might be a necessary (but not sufficient)
condition for an anticommons to emerge. Patent counts alone simply do not
take into account the scope of the field of invention, which Adelman and
DeAngelis contend is essentially "unbounded., 151 This contention, coupled
with observations that: (a) "in the great majority of cases, patents can be
avoided by undertaking parallel lines of research;"' 52 (b) the number of
licenses needed to move forward with research "tends to be very low"
despite diffuse patent ownership,1 53 and; (c) the "continuous record of new
market entrants,"' 54 leads the authors to infer that biomedical research,
whether carried out in academic
or corporate environments, is in fact
55
relatively "uncongested."1

Turning to the academic context specifically, a study by Lori Pressman
and colleagues provides at least preliminary evidence that technology
transfer practices at large and experienced U.S. academic institutions
"accommodate both economic goals, such as revenue generation and new
company formation, and social goals, such as ensuring utilization and
availability of federally funded inventions."'156 Pressman et al. articulated
two main findings. First, "simple reports on exclusive and nonexclusive
licensing miss important nuances of licensing practice.' 57 On the contrary,
"[t]echnologies can remain available while exclusively licensed, if the
exclusivity is for a particular field of use, or if research or humanitarian-use
exemptions have been included in the license."'' 58 Further, the quantitative

specific circumstances whereas later commentators, proponents of what Adelman and
DeAngelis dub "generalized anticommons theory" are rarely so specific. See David E.
Adelman & Kathryn L. DeAngelis, Patent Metrics: The Mismeasure of Innovation in the
Biotech PatentDebate, 85 TEX. L. REv. 1677, 1684-86 (2007).
151. Id.at 1699.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1697 citing Walsh et al., View from the Bench, supra note 147, at 2002. It is
worth noting that while the actual number of licenses executed may be only a handful,
several more could potentially be legally required if the patent holder had awareness of the
researcher's activities. Moreover, while a "handful" may not seem like many in the abstract,
licensing and other types of research agreements (e.g. MTAs) can take weeks if not months
to negotiate, on occasion, and accordingly invite considerable delay and expense.
154. Id. at 1681.
155. Id.at 1699.
156. Lori Pressman et al., The Licensing of DNA Patents by US Academic Institutions:
An Empirical Survey, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 31 (2006). In terms of methodology,
Pressman et al. contacted 30 leading academic research institutions in the U.S., which were
assigned the largest number of DNA patents according to a search algorithm they had
devised. Id. Nineteen institutions responded to the survey, providing detailed information
from roughly 200 licensing agreements as well as written responses to open-ended questions
regarding, for example, general practices and/or operating philosophies in relation to
particular types of DNA-based patents. Id.
157. Id. at 38.
158. Id.
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portion of the survey revealed that licenses typically contain provisions to
those effects. 159 Second, TTOs exhibited considerable "market sensitivity:"
as the costs of patent prosecution have increased,
institutions have become
60
more selective in what they decide to patent.'
The ubiquity of TTOs, regardless of their specific practices, arguably still
speaks to broader cultural change. However, hard evidence of research
agendas and scientific practices being shaped by commercialization goals
has been more difficult to find, 16 1 attacked as being based on a purist
162
account
of the way
things traditionally
were,
or viewed
as (at best)
indirect evidence
of change-not
necessarily
bad change.
163
D. IgnoringPatents64 as Straw Man
Interpreting the preceding body of data is complex. Arguably, above all
else, what these studies indicate is that perceptions matter. 65 This point is
crucial both in explaining why patent hold-ups and anticommons are not
more pervasive, and why this framing of the issue-whether Myriad-like
patent blocking is widespread, and whether potential for royalty stacking
causes an anticommons-seems to have diverted attention away from the
real barriers to better quality biomarkers research.
159. Id.
Thus, "licensing practices at the large and experienced academic
institutions ... are largely in agreement" with the NIH guidelines (research tools and best
practices). Id. at 38-39.
160. Id. at 39.
161. Empirical evidence of such a shift, for example, of faculty publishing more in
applied science journals than they had previously, has been difficult to find. See Jerry G.
Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, Who Is Selling the Ivory Tower? Sources of Growth in
University Licensing, 48 MGMT SCI. 90 (2002). But cf Huang & Murray, supra note 145, at
150-54. There are, however, several qualitative accounts of broader cultural change within
publicly funded research institutions. See SHELDON KRIMSKY, SCIENCE IN THE PRIVATE
INTEREST: HAS THE LURE OF PROFITS CORRUPTED BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH? (2003);
WASHBURN, supra note 105; Risa L. Lieberwitz, Confronting the Privatization and
Commercializationof Academic Research: An Analysis of Social Implications at the Local,
National,and Global Levels, 12 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 109 (2005).
162. See Peter Shorett, Paul Rabinow, & Paul R. Billings, The Changing Norms of the
Life Sciences 21 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 123 (2003). But cf Richard R. Nelson, The
Market Economy, and the Scientific Commons, 33 RES. POL'Y 455 (2004).
163. See, e.g., Caulfield et al., Evidence and Anecdotes, supra note 137.
164. In an interesting article, Mark Lemley recently analyzed the costs and benefits of
the status quo, where patents are often ignored, versus a world in which patent rights are
effectively treated like real property: a world where ignoring patents is not possible and users
of patented technologies must always obtain permission from patent-holders. See Mark A.
Lemley, IgnoringPatents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19 (2008). While he concluded that the
practice of ignoring patents was not ideal but likely to continue (because the patent law
reforms that would be needed represent a "radical" departure from the present system),
Lemley did not specifically discuss the relationship between the practice of ignoring patents
upon the direction of research activities. See id. at 33.
165. Herder & Gold, supranote 149, at 7-8 (discussing the importance of perceptions).
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Beginning with the former observation, the fact that an academic
experimental use research exemption no longer forms part of United States'
law does not immediately matter if researchers act as though such an
exemption is in place. 166 Of course, perceptions of risk can change
"dramatically... and... even abruptly," 167 if, for example, the Supreme
Court revisited the state immunity doctrine that currently shields state
universities from liability for patent infringement. 168 But while legallyminded commentators do not mask their discomfort with working solutions
that amount to breaking the law, an increasing number of them appear to
take solace in this kind of realism. 169 Ignoring patents is simply what goes
on, seemingly for the good of science, research and development (R&D),
and therefore, us all.
Therein lies the crux of the problem sought to be captured here in
relation to biomarkers research. Perhaps actors are ignoring patents of
others, and this allows research to continue to go on. But actors are not
ignoring patents of their own, and it is an open question whether this allows
research to go forward,for the good of science, R&D, and us all.
This point may seem trite at first. Why would researchers (and/or their
parent institutions) ignore patents that they have pursued and paid for? The
166. See Pressman et al., supra note 156 (finding that it does not matter legally if TTOs
secure such a research exemption through contractual means).
167. An expert group assembled by the National Research Council highlighted two sets
of circumstances in which this could occur:
Institutions, aware that they enjoy no protection from legal liability, may become
more concerned about their potential patent infringement liability and take more
active steps to raise researchers' awareness or even to try to regulate their
behavior. The latter could be both burdensome on research and largely
ineffective because of researchers' autonomy and their ignorance or at best
uncertainty about what intellectual property applies in what circumstances.
Alternatively, patent holders, equally aware that universities are not shielded from
liability by a research exception, could take more active steps to assert their
patents against them. This may not lead to more patent suits against
universities-indeed, established companies are usually reluctant to pursue
litigation against research universities-but it could involve demands for
licensing fees, grant-back rights, and other terms that are burdensome to research.
Certainly, some holders of gene-based diagnostic patents are currently active in
asserting their intellectual property rights. Even if neither of these scenarios
materializes, researchers and institutions that unknowingly and with impunity
infringe on others' intellectual property could later encounter difficulties in
commercializing their inventions.
STEPHEN A. MERRILL & ANNE-MARIE MAZZA, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REAPING THE
BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND PROTEOMic RESEARCH 134 (2006) (emphasis in original).

168. See Gary Pulsinelli, Freedom to Explore: Using the Eleventh Amendment to
Liberate Researchers at State Universities from Liability for Intellectual Property
Infringements, 82 WASH. L. R. 275 (2007), for an in depth discussion of this issue.
169. See Caulfield et al., Evidence andAnecdotes, supra note 137; Walsh et al., Working
Through the Patent Problem, supra note 146; Walsh et al., View from the Bench, supra note
147.
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problem, however, is that having patents of one's own can lead researchers
to collaborate less with others. Less collaboration means that researchers
may not avail themselves of all of the relevant knowledge and resources
that might otherwise benefit their research project. Taken together, two
recent studies of the stem cell research community in Canada-a
community with high standing globally in terms of patents, publications,
and prestige 7°-potentially provide a powerful illustration of this. Pairing
the first and second studies together also shows how experts studying the
impact of patents in the research domain often miss the significance of
researchers not ignoring their own patents.
In the first study, Tim Caulfield and colleagues collected survey
responses from 108 Canadian stem cell scientists regarding the perceived
impact of patents, licenses, material transfer agreements, and
commercialization objectives upon their research. 17 1 While almost half of
the senior researchers ("primary investigators" or PIs) within the survey
population viewed patents in a negative light, the authors found that very
few PIs personally experienced negative effects, such as being refused a
license to a patented technology. 172 Material and information sharing was
high (93% of PIs reported "routinely" sharing research materials with
scientists at other institutions or private firms), although 66% of PIs
admitted to delaying such sharing in order to preserve patenting
opportunities.173
Overall, there was broad support for the
commercialization objectives of the research network, 174 leading Caulfield
et al. to conclude that there was only "minimal evidence of problems
175
associated with patenting and commercialization of17 research."
The study,
6
al.
et
Walsh
in other words, echoed the findings of
The second study (of the same community) employed a different
methodology, one that avoids the positive social response bias that may
influence opinion surveys. 177 The methodology was basically twofold. First,
170. See DAVID CAMPBELL ET AL., SCIENCE-METRIX & MNBC, POTENTIAL FOR STEM
CELLS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN CANADA: GREAT PROMISES AND CHALLENGES, available

at
http://www.science-metrix.com/pdf/SM_2003 015_ICStemCellsPotentialCanada.
pdf.
171. Timothy Caulfield et al., Patents, Commercializationand the Canadian Stem Cell
Research Community, 3 REGENERATIVE MED. 483, 483 (2008).

172. Id. at 486.
173. Id. at 487.
174. Id.at 489.
175. Id.
176. See Walsh et al., Working Through the Patent Problem, supra note 146, at 1021;
Walsh et al., Viewfrom the Bench, supra note 147, at 2003.
177. Tania Bubela & Andreas Strotmann, Designing Metrics to Assess the Impacts and
Social Benefits of Publicly Funded Research in Health and Agricultural Biotechnology 6
(The Innovation Partnership, Working Document, 2008), http://theinnovationpartnership.org/
data/ieg/documents/cases/TIP_Innovation MetricsCaseStudy.pdf.
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the authors, Tania Bubela and Andreas Strotmann, compiled a database
comprised of: (a) all U.S., European, and Canadian patents filed or held by
PIs; (b) all publications by PIs; and, (c) all other publications that the PIs
cite themselves or which cite the work of the PIs.178 The database contained
hundreds of thousands of documents in total. 79 Second, Bubela and
Strotmann used the database to develop a series of computational models of
collaboration amongst scientists in the network. 180 They tracked and
mapped who patented with whom, who published with whom, and citation
patterns amongst the group as a whole.' 8 ' The Canadian stem cell research
community was found to be quite collaborative, both nationally and
internationally. 82 But the central finding the authors made was this: the
more patents a researcher held, the less collaborators she or he was likely to
have. 83 Not ignoring one's own patents thus has a consequence: stem cell
scientists that patent most seem to collaborate the least. How this impacts
the overall quality of those scientists' research projects is difficult to say.
Perhaps collaboration matters less to scientists who are in a position to
patent inventions with any degree of frequency, and are thus more likely to
command a full-fledged laboratory and/or to have considerable resources at
their disposal. Also, Bubela and Strotman's study did not track how the
number of patents correlated with licensing, which some might suggest is
the form of collaboration we should care most about. However, the current
state of biomarkers research would seem to undercut the suggestion that
licensing has thus far positively influenced biomarker qualification.
But present discourse does not give pride of place to quality concerns.
We, as scholars, are locked into a debate as to whether Myriad is one in a
million versus one of a million and to what extent anticommons theory
holds, such that the absence of clear and cogent empirical evidence of a
problem effectively silences calls for improving the status quo. To be sure,
further research is needed to assess the scope and unpack the complexity of
this behavioral problem (of not sharing, or sharing less than optimal levels
of data when patents are obtained at a particular point in the
commercialization process) and what measures might be used to counter it
effectively.184 In the meantime, however, this behavioral tendency remains
bound up in a conflict of agendas that some argue is already stunting the

178.

Id

179. Id. at 3.
180. Id. at 6.
181. Id. at4.
182. Id. at 17.
183. "Most importantly,... commercialization activity, measured by the number of
patents, negatively impacted the total number of collaborators .... Bubela & Strotmann,
supra note 177, at 26.
184. A series of research questions will be framed in the conclusion, infra Part V.
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research environment 1-8 a conflict that, if not better resolved, may
fundamentally compromise the integrity of various research initiatives
connected to personalized medicine, including a large-scale cancer research
initiative set to embark upon integrating stem cell biology and biomarker
technologies.
IV. CONFLICTING AGENDAS, SUB-OPTIMAL SHARING?

Recall that the gravest concern about biomarkers highlighted in the
literature is poor validation and clinical qualification. Commentators
attribute this to a flawed regulatory framework and the bad business models
that can flourish, if only temporarily, as a result. Thus far, the conversation
around biomarkers formally to do with patent law has focused exclusively
upon whether biomarkers are patentable subject matter following
LabCorp,186 and the impact of such patents at point-of-patient care.' 87 The
latter poses an immense threat to quality-of care in terms of denying
physicians the ability to employ clinical tests. But it does not speak to
whether those tests are valid and useful in the first place. And it is the
broader framing of the debate around the impact of upstream patenting
upon knowledge dissemination, coupled with the perception that the main
challenges facing the biomarkers field are regulatory-related, has diverted
attention from several concerns about the quality of biomarkers research, as
well as potentially suboptimal levels of collaboration and information
sharing.
True, the last two pieces of evidence cited in the foregoing speak only to
individual (stem cell) researchers. If anything, though, it appears safe to
assume that this same tendency to share less, and to collaborate less-for
the purposes of biomarker qualification'88-resonates within a corporate
185. As Robert Cook-Deegan et al., The Dangers of Diagnostic Monopolies, 458
NATURE 405, 406 (2009), explain:
Academic institutions play an important part in clinical genetic testing. They
own most of the patents relevant to Mendelian disease testing, and 60% of
clinical genetic testing laboratories are within universities. Academic institutions
thus both own most genetic-diagnostic patents and operate many of the
laboratoriesagainst which such patents are enforced This paradox derivesfrom
technology licensing and clinical laboratory services that are run by different
partsof universitiesand have different missions. These need to be aligned.
Id.at 406 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
186. See Barton, supra note 29, at 941; Ho, supra note 91, at 464; Kesselheim & Mello,
supra note 93, at 2036.
187. Kesselheim & Mello, supra note 93, at 2036. See Ozdemir et al., supra note 38, at
942.
188. Keep in mind that this is prior to, or distinct from, the type of collaboration
witnessed between Genzyme and Novartis in connection with Gleevec. Barton, supra note
29, at 940. In that case, Genzyme approached Novartis after Gleevec had received
regulatory approval. Id.

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol18/iss2/4

32

2009]

Herder: Patents
& (and)
the Progress
of Personalized Medicine:
Biomarkers
Patents
& The
Progress
of Personalized
Medicine

vehicle. In some cases, this lack of sharing and collaboration could arise
from the fact that smaller firms, especially start-ups, are often controlled or
directed by the same type of inventor-scientists that Bubela and Strotmann
captured in their study. More fundamentally, though, this simply flows
from current business practices in the biotech sector. If (and once) a
company believes they have valuable-but not necessarily clinically
valid-biomarker data in hand, and it has taken steps to secure the
intellectual property rights, then and only then is it likely to approach
another corporate entity to co-develop a product. Witness the pattern of
development that led to Gleevec. Herceptin would seem to stand alone as
an example of a prioricoordinated development amongst multiple actors.
One might think that healthcare providers and payers who have a vested
interest in having more effective therapies, not to mention access to scores
of data regarding patients and responses to treatment that would directly
benefit firms attempting to commercialize biomarker technologies, 8 9 would
help drive behavior in a different direction. However, many healthcare
institutions today, particularly ones housing medical schools, have TTOs
operating within the same set of parameters as university TTOs. 90
Numbers of patents, licenses, etc. are by and large how performance 1is
91
Therefore, like many of their university counterparts,
measured.
healthcare institution TTOs often do not contemplate how patenting and
licensing decisions potentially impact development of the field as a whole.
Since filing for a patent on a biomarker and getting a small biotech firm to
assume the costs of patent prosecution going forward in exchange for a(n
exclusive) license to the technology is typically seen as an intrinsically
good thing,' 9 healthcare TTOs often do not take the extra step of creating
and maintaining a strong feedback loop between the firm's
commercialization activities and patient profiles as they continue to unfold
over time. In short, the deep conflict in agendas between those tasked with
commercializing research findings and those offering clinical testing

189. Allison, supra note 43, at 516.
190. Or, to put it differently, the majority of the institutions (60%) that offer clinical
genetic testing services in the United States are also part of a university. See Cho et al.,
supra note 139.
191. Note that Pressman et al. found that more experienced, well-resourced TTOs
appear to adequately balance both social and economic goals. Pressman, supra note 156, at
38-39. However, many TTOs are less than ten years old-the timeframe it usually takes
TTOs to "get out of the red" financially-and many more are under-resourced, suggesting
that the average TTO may not balance these goals as well as the elite institutions Pressman et
al. surveyed.
192. See Matthew Herder & Josephine Johnston, Licensing for Knowledge Transfer in
Human Genetics Research: A Study of Business Models For Licensing and Technology
Transfer in Human Genetics Patents, in BIOTECHNOLOGY IP & ETHICS (Richard Gold &
Bartha Knoppers eds., forthcoming 2009).
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services based upon that same body of knowledge is left poorly resolved., 93
This is not always the case. The British Columbia Cancer Agency (BC
CA), for instance, follows a different approach. 194 At the BC CA,
researchers have collected scores of data relating to the "genomic
signatures" of biopsy tumor samples taken from the patient population the
institution treats.
The institution tracks how patients with different
signatures respond to different courses of treatment and correlates them
with other available patho-physiological indicators of the disease. These
genomic signatures are patentable biomarkers that are of considerable
interest to the private sector. However, the BC CA recognizes them as
patient (as opposed to patentable) information.
While industry
representatives have expressed surprise when initially confronted with this
position, BC CA has entered into several cooperative research agreements
with private sector partners to develop new clinically proven diagnostic,
95
prognostic, and theragnostic technologies from these genomic signatures.
Adopting such an approach may be critical to overcoming the quality
barrier to molecular personalized medicine. Meaningful partnerships with
continual hard data exchange, not simply partnerships on paper or licenses
to exploit intellectual property rights, are what make biomarker validation
and clinical qualification realizable goals. What purpose, clinicallyspeaking, do preventive, diagnostic, prognostic, predictive, therapeutic, and
toxicity biomarkers serve if they cannot be interpreted and used in
conjunction with one another?
The BC CA appears, however, to constitute the exception that proves the
rule. At present, the normal pattern seems to involve a decoupling of
discovery and commercialization once the research agreement is signed, or
the patent rights are assigned, licensed, etc. The architects of a new largescale, cross-border research initiative, the Cancer Stem Cell Consortium,
must attend to this decoupling problem or else risk perpetuating the trend to
the detriment of a more personalized approach to treating cancer.
A. The CancerStem Cell Consortium
How to effectively treat cancer in any of its forms remains one of
modem medicine's greatest challenges. A growing proportion of the
oncology research and treatment community believe that a specific type of
cell contained found in cancerous tumors, so-called "cancer stem cells,"
may hold the key to this mystery and give way to a new treatment
193. Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 185, at 406.
194. Id.
195. Whether this strategy is necessary or sufficient to instill a stronger relationship
between the parties involved in research, clinical, and commercialization activities merits
further empirical study. See infra Part V.
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paradigm. Evidence of cancer stem cells only dates back to 1997,196 but
there has been an explosion of research connected to this theory of cancer in
recent years. 197 And the proponents of a new initiative called the Cancer
Stem Cell Consortium (CSCC)' 98 hope to capitalize upon this core
biological insight:
The discovery of a rare class of tumour cells called cancer stem cells
(CSC) has profound implications for treating cancer patients. Most
current anti-cancer therapies are aimed at killing cells that comprise the
bulk of the tumour mass, but are not responsible for the primary growth
of tumours. CSC in many common malignancies are the major culprits at
the root of cancer accounting for tumour growth and metastases. For
reasons that are not yet understood, CSC are resistant to the toxic effects
of current anticancer therapies including radiation and chemotherapeutic
drugs; consequently tumours often recur leading to relapse of cancer
CSC, new
patients treated with these agents. By specifically targeting
99
cancer treatments and potential cures will be within reach.'

The CSCC was conceived by members of Canada and California's stem
cell research communities-the same groups who pioneered the discovery
of cancer stem cells-as well as corresponding technology transfer and
business communities. 200 However, it has since shifted to a Canadianbased, -staffed, and -funded initiative. 20 1 A strong link with Californiabased researchers and institutions was, however, established in June 2008,
when the CSCC concluded a three-year agreement with the California
196. See Dominique Bonnet & John E. Dick, Human Acute Myeloid Leukemia Is
Organized As a Hierarchy that Originatesfrom a Primitive Hematopoietic Cell, 3 NATURE
MED. 730 (July 1997).

197. The Journal of Clinical Oncology, for instance, recently devoted an entire
supplement to the area. See Bruce M. Boman & Max S. Wicha, Cancer Stem Cells: A Step
Toward the Cure, J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 2795 (2008) (providing an overview of the various

research articles included in the supplement).
198. Cancer Stem Cell Consortium, http://www.cancerstemcellconsortium.com/
index.php?page=home (last visited Mar. 16, 2009).
199. JOHN A. HASSEL & CATRIONA JAMEISON, CANADA-CALIFORNIA STRATEGIC
INNOVATION PARTNERSHIP, CANCER STEM CELL CONSORTIUM, MAY 2007 CSCC POSITION

at
available
Paper],
Position
CCSIP
[hereinafter
(2007)
3
PAPER
http://www.cancerstemcellconsortium.com/uploads/PDFs/CSC%20Consortium%2OMay%20
10.pdf.
200. More specifically, members of these two communities came together under the
auspices of the "Canada-California Strategic Innovation Partnership," and conceived of the
CSCC during a meeting held at Stanford University in January 2007. Id.
201. The Board of Directors is comprised of presidents and executive directors of
several Canadian research funding agencies as well as one leading stem cell scientist-all of
which are located in Toronto or Ottawa, Ontario. To date, the CSCC has secured
investments of more than $100 million from a variety of Canadian partners. See Cancer
Us, http://www.cancerstemcellconsortium.con/
About
Cell
Consortium,
Stem
index.php?page=about-us.
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Institute of Regenerative Medicine, the body charged with funding stem cell
research in that state, to formally explore opportunities for collaboration. °2
The first such opportunity was announced in February 2009, with the
release of CIRMs' request for applications for "Disease Team Research
Awards. 2 °3
Although the request is not limited to Canadian and
Californian researchers, 2° it seems20 5likely that one or more CSCC projects

will be funded under this program.
As with any large-scale research initiative the CSCC faces several
immediate practical challenges, including ones related to intellectual
property. 206 However, the more intractable issue stems from what the
CSCC's stated vision of focusing upon commercialization-a "strategic
priority" of the CSCC 2 07-should entail. On one hand, the research and
discovery program envisioned by the CSCC clearly aims to harness scores
of patient tumor samples and associated clinical data for the purpose of
biomarker validation and qualification:
The availability of highly enriched CSC populations from multiple
diverse tumours (blood, breast, brain, prostate and colon) will enable
genomic and proteomic analyses of these cells, a required first step to
discover CSC biomarkers and molecular therapeutic targets. Genomic
studies will include identifying all the genes that are expressed in CSC
and learning whether these genes differ between CSC and the nontumourigenic cancer cells from the same tumour, and between the CSC
and the normal adult stem cells of the organ of origin of the tumour.
Candidate biomarkers and molecular therapeutic targets will be validated
using patient tumour samples and cell cultures derived from tumours.

202.

Id.

CAL. INST. FOR REGENERATIVE MED., RFA 09-01: CIRM DISEASE TEAM RESEARCH
AWARD, availableat http://www.cirm.ca.gov/RFA/pdf/rfa_09-01/RFA 0901031009.pdf
204. Other collaborative funding partners listed in the RFA are the Medical Research
Council of the U.K. and the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation. Id.at 3.
205. The request for applications specifies that the CSCC aims to fund up to two
projects, each to the tune of $20M CDN. Id.at 25.
206. Given that this is a large-scale, cross-border research initiative, the CSCC will need
to address a number of intellectual property management issues. See Herder & Gold, supra
note 149, at 30-32. And there is also the possibility of encountering a variety of data-,
materials-, patent-, and ethics-related barriers. See For an in-depth account of these potential
barriers, see David E.Winickoff, Krishanu Saha & Gregory D. Graff, Opening Stem Cell
Research and Development: A Policy Proposalfor the Management of Data, Intellectual
Property, and Ethics, 9 YALE J.HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHIcs 52 (2009). To date, no
comprehensive patent landscape pertaining to cancer stem cells has been performed.
However, as those behind the CSCC have noted, "70% of patents referring to [cancer stem
cells] have been published in the last two years." See CCSIP Position Paper, supra note 199,
at 3.
207. CCSIP Position Paper, supra note 199, at 10.
203.
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For example, we will study the expression of candidate biomarkers in
organ-specific tumours (e.g., breast) of large numbers of cancer patients
to ensure that they identify CSC. CSC biomarkers will be linked with
clinical parameters such as patient prognosis and treatment outcome to
firmly establish the clinical relevance of CSC.2 °s
Such an approach is critical according, for example, to PCAST. 0 9 On the
other hand, the CSCC is expected to yield a variety of commercial
outcomes, including "build[ing] an exciting wave of new biotechnology
companies based on CSCC discoveries. 21 Whether those companies (or
the individuals behind them) will turn a blind eye to the store of clinical
data that the CSCC claims it will continue to amass once they have filed
patent applications or garnered interest from larger commercial entities, in
other words, adopt the same business model that appears to be guiding most
biomarker firms in existence, essentially remains to be seen. Perhaps the
CSCC's stated intention of not seeking intellectual property rights of its
own, but rather actively striving to enhance the value of any intellectual
property secured by participating researchers and institutions by funding
proof-of-concept, proof-of-principle and validation studies 21' will have a
positive mitigating effect.
The issue would seem to reduce to a question of incentives, of how much
funding the CSCC will be able to secure and thus devote to such valueadding functions, of what (potentially lucrative) deals with private entities
further down the commercialization chain for the exclusive rights to a given
cancer biomarker technology eventually surface, of what changes, if any,
are made to the regulatory process perhaps necessitating the kind of robust
validation that the CSCC is positioning itself to supply, or of any other new
incentives that arise.
B. The Genomics and PersonalizedMedicine Act
The proposed Genomics and PersonalizedMedicine Act of 2008 (H.R.
6498) may help inform speculation about what the relative incentives will
ultimately prove to be.22 Amongst other objectives, the bill aims to clarify
the respective roles of the FDA and CMS with respect to biomarkers and
other technologies to reduce redundancy, which should reduce the
disincentives associated with seeking regulatory approval. 213 H.R. 6498
208. Id. at 7-8.
209. PCAST, supra note 3, at 2-3.
210. Id.at 2.
211. Id.atlO-11.
212. Assuming that a substantially similar version of this bill, H.R. 6498, is eventually
re-introduced.
213. See Genomics and Personalized Medicine Act of 2008, H.R. 6498, 110th Cong. §
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to5
also stipulates that the FDA and CMS should seek to encourage firms 21
incorporate "companion diagnostics

2 14

and "genetic screening tools

into the technological platforms they develop on the strength of the
assumption that a newly created information registry will work to ensure
that such technologies are both analytically and clinically valid. 216 Finally,
if enacted, the legislation would establish a tax credit for an "amount equal
to the qualified research expenses paid or incurred by the taxpayer during
with the development of a qualified
the taxable year in connection
2 17
companion diagnostic test.,

The latter measure may act as a powerful incentive for improved
coordination amongst biotech and biopharmaceutical companies. Unless
the diagnostic is of robust clinical validity from the outset, however, this tax
credit may not serve the bill's underlying goal of realizing the potential of
personalized medicine. The bill cleverly attempts to address this goal by
requiring that manufacturers of genetic tests submit to the registry's
secretary evidence showing the analytical and clinical validity of the tests
they intend to submit for regulatory approval. 1 8 But whether such a
requirement would be practicable to enforce remains uncertain. Nor does
this requirement squarely address why it appears that such tests and
biomarker technologies more generally are lacking in quality: the behaviors
and business strategies engendered by patent rights that can work against
sustained collaboration and data sharing. It would appear radically more
efficient to promote greater collaboration a priori than to ask (if not also
subsidize through tax credits) commercial outfits to individually validate
and qualify biomarker technologies. There is a risk that many of those
efforts will in the end simply be duplicative of one another.21 9
In skirting the issue of intellectual property, the proposed legislation fails
to address this possibility although it would commission the National
Academy of Sciences (NAS) to develop recommendations about further
7(a) (2008).
214. Id.§ 7(c).
215. Id.§ 7(d).
216. Id.§ 7(a).
217. Id. § 8(a).
218. Id.§ 7(a). There are essentially two exceptions to this requirement: first, if the test
has been cleared under sections 510(k), 515 or 520(m) of the Food,Drug and Cosmetic Act,
then no information need be submitted to the registry; second, if the "intended use of a
laboratory-developed genetic test is limited solely to the measurement of an analytical
property or characteristic," that is, it is "not intended to be used to diagnose or screen for any
disease or condition, or to otherwise aid in decisionmaking with respect to health," then no
submission need be made. Id.
219. See Baker, supra note 23, at 303. In other words, it is conceivable that H.R. 6498
will generate (even more) wasteful research: "there are multiple groups... working on the
same problem, each gathering proprietary data... spending new money and not producing
new value." Id.
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incentives to encourage companion diagnostics. 220 Assuming the NAS
would be persuaded of the overarching argument developed throughout this
paper, answers to the following research questions should help inform any
recommendations made with respect to intellectual property rights and
related practices in the realm of biomarkers.
V. CONCLUDING QUESTIONS: MIXING MARKERS WITH METAPHOR
Two sets of research questions follow from the foregoing. The first set
arises from the above argument's underlying hypothesis; namely, that
deciding not to patent a particular biomarker discovery at the earliest
practicable opportunity 221 will lead to higher quality innovations that,
subsequently, can become the subject of more valuable (economically and
socially) patents-what we might term truly choice patents. In turn, this
alternative course of development and (delayed) patenting could foster
better business models, more sustainable economic growth, and clinicallyproven healthcare interventions. Testing this hypothesis will, at the very
least, require more systematic efforts to answer to the following:
• What factors (e.g. inventor interest, actual/projected licensing revenues,
performance goals) inform an institution's decision to seek patent
protection in respect of a biomarker, and when? Moreover, how are the
different factors weighted, and why?
. Does the decision to file for patent protection, however made, at the
earliest practicable opportunity undermine subsequent efforts (by the
inventor(s), other academic scientists, and/or putative licensees) to
validate and qualify the biomarker in statistical and clinical terms?
• Or, conversely, does the decision not to file a patent application at the
earliest practicable opportunity-assuming other institutions are found to
mirror, consciously or not, the approach adopted by the BC CA-facilitate subsequent efforts (by the inventor(s), other academic scientists,
and/or putative licensees) to validate and qualify the biomarker in
statistical and clinical terms?
We already know that most biomarker discoveries-as the product of
university scientists' research-are licensed at a very early stage, almost
always long before a patent is granted and often before a patent application

220. H.R. 6498 § 7(b).
221. Defining with precision what the 'earliest practicable opportunity' will, of course,
be critical to any inquiry along these lines. For the sake of discussion here, the phrase can be
interpreted to mean the point at which 'proof of concept'-a phrase commonly used by
scientists, research institutions, firms, and patent lawyers-has been achieved.
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is even filed.222 The question therefore becomes whether the quality of the
biomarkers suffers as a result, and whether choosing to patent at a later
point in commercialization process might have a mitigating effect.
Assuming this is borne out through further empirical research, the second
set of research questions aims to decipher what measures will best help
correct these deficiencies in meaningful collaboration and sharing:
- Is it necessary to relegate biomarkers, or some portion thereof, to nonpatentable subject matter in order to engender more meaningful
research
223
partnerships characterized by continuous data exchange?
- Could researchers, institutions, and firms be encouraged through other
means (e.g. the tax credit contemplated in H.R. 6498) to work more
collaboratively?
• Could increasing awareness of the approach adopted by the British
Columbia Cancer Agency, by itself or in conjunction with other
incentives, facilitate greater levels of sharing?
• Might proprietary algorithms designed to integrate and analyse various
biomarker data effectively nullify any benefits associated with relegating
biomarkers to non-patentable subject matter or adopting an approach like
the Cancer Agency? And, if so, what limitations should be placed upon
patenting algorithms in connection with biomarkers?
This list of research questions is by no means exhaustive. There are
those who would argue that any suggestion of exempting biomarkers from
patentability is not a viable political proposition.224 At base, such an
argument is predicated on the notion that such an interference with the
market is unwarranted in the absence of empirical evidence demonstrating
that patent rights (and the practices they can engender) are in fact to blame
for the current state of affairs. According to this view, other barriers to
personalized medicine,
especially the regulatory framework, should be
225
priority.
given
This position may be a by-product of a conception of the relationship
between quality, patent rights and attendant practices that is simply too
222. See e.g., Daniel W. Elfenbein, Publications,Patents,and the Marketfor University
Inventions, 63 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 688, 693-95 (2007).
223. Barton, for instance, has suggested this as a possible reform. See Barton, supra
note 23, at 941. Justice Breyer's dissent in LabCorp. is also consistent with this. Lab. Corp.
of Am. v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 134-38 (2006).
224. See PCAST, supra note 3, at 38ff. The PCAST Report, for instance, seems to take
the position that changes in intellectual property law have already gone too far. Id.
225. See generally PCAST, supra note 3.

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol18/iss2/4

40

Herder: Patents & (and) the Progress of Personalized Medicine: Biomarkers
20091

Patents & The Progress of Personalized Medicine

short-sighted, if not blind to the interconnectedness of patenting practices
with other elements in the health innovation system.2 26 Arguably, for
example, the ambiguities and redundancies in existing regulatory standards
are, at least partially, attributable to the paucity of biomarker data available
in the public domain. Regulators may be ill-equipped in their efforts to
reform the process without greater information at their disposal. In other
words, perhaps, our rapidly increasing, but still nascent appreciation of the
complexity of our own molecular biological make-up demands a different
approach. That is, the burden should fall upon those electing to patent
early-stage biomarkers to demonstrate that the quality of their discoveries
and any healthcare interventions that they will be integrated into would, on
balance, not be sacrificed as a result; in short, that license price speaks to
patent quality (read: clinical utility) and not something else. 27
To underscore this final point and at the same time further hypothesize as
to why patent scholars have under-theorized and under-investigated
biomarkers' poor quality, it is helpful to close with reference to the
metaphor from which Heller and Eisenberg's anticommons theory was
born: Garrett Hardin's "tragedy of the commons. 228 As with Heller and
Eisenberg's piece thirty years later, Hardin's piece spawned a sprawling
literature about shared or public resources of varying kinds, and whether
they were in fact doomed to overuse as Hardin predicted. His theory was
justly criticized for over-breadth, 229 but nonetheless showed remarkable
staying power.23 °
Yet discussion of the problem of overpopulation, which served as the
basis for Hardin's metaphor, is conspicuously absent from much of the
ensuing literature. Hardin's main thesis was that "freedom to breed" would
226. To be sure, some scholars have begun to gesture at this. Cook-Deegan and
colleagues, for instance, note:
Monopoly effects on test quality are equivocal. For example, in 2006, Myriad's
methods of BRCA testing were shown to miss some DNA deletions and
rearrangements. Yet such problems cannot be ascribed only to the monopoly.
Problems are apparent in genetic testing for other conditions offered by labs with
non-exclusive rights. Test quality is a general problem but monopolies can
exacerbate it.
See Cook-Deegan et al., supra note 185, at 405 (citations omitted). Note, however, that this
statement appears directed primarily toward the analytic validity of the laboratory testing
services, as opposed to the clinical validity of the tests themselves. See infra Part II.C.
227. E.g. Elfenbein, supra note 222, at 713. Elfenbein has shown that inventor and/or
institution prestige can increase an invention's visibility, but seemingly not the price putative
licensees are willing to pay for it.
228. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 ScI. 1243 (1968).
229. CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION, 140-45, 185-88 (1994) (arguing that
privatization is not the best solution to some public resources or spaces, such as rivers and
parks).
230. This may be attributable to the theory's rhetorical purchase, again, much like the
anticommons after it.
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because decisions made by individuals seldom benefit

society as a whole. Just the opposite according to Hardin: In a world that is
fundamentally limited, the tendency of every rational "man" to maximize
his gain, to increase "his herd without limit," spells disaster.232 Hardin
worked through a variety of examples involving common spaces or
resources-from pastures to parking, parks, and pollution-to illustrate his
point. But whereas successors in the debate expended their intellectual
energies on the property implications of the tragedy, focusing on the same
or similar examples, for Hardin, the real problem was the growing human
population. That his call to limit individuals' "freedom to breed" was later
ousted by a narrower focus on the nature of various resources and whether
they should be the subject of property rights probably did not surprise
Hardin. He foresaw the inevitable unpopularity of his view.233
The normative thrust of Hardin's piece nevertheless carries an insight
that is critical to biomarkers research and development-one that has
largely been lost in the midst of the current debate around patenting early
stage research. At its core, Hardin's argument questions the sustainability
of certain behavior and practices. These behaviors and practices are not
innate, but instead result from the system in which "[e]ach man is
locked., 234 The argument developed in the foregoing parts of this paper,
while not framed in such sweeping terms, is substantially similar. Most
commercial biomarkers research to date is of questionable quality and
utility, shortcomings that stem not simply from the complexity of the
science, but owing to a regulatory framework that condones poor business
models, a set of patent standards that legitimizes the same, and attitudinal
tendencies typically engendered by patent rights that work against greater
levels of collaboration. And having become preoccupied with testing the
accuracy of Heller and Eisenberg's hypothesis, interlocutors in the patent
debate have neglected to question whether improving the status quo should
rest on the validity of the anticommons.
Hardin was prepared to suggest that the freedom to reproduce should be
limited to avert the ruin he foresaw. The success stories from biomarkers
research have been few and far between, and performing the activity, unlike
reproduction, is in no way integral to human nature. Yet no one remarking
about the impact of increased patenting upon the conduct of scientific
research has been willing to suggest that certain pathways to commercialize
biomarkers research be foreclosed. The reason, perhaps, is that the latter
smacks of socialism and is therefore frightening to (Western)
231.
232.
233.
234.

Hardin, supra note 228, at 1248.
Id.at 1244.
Id.at 1246 (commenting on the UN Declaration of Human Rights).
Id.at 1244.
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commentators.2 35
However, taking Hardin's concern about sustainability seriously need not
be formulated as a new call to halt sexual activity, much less do away with
the capitalist precepts of commercializing science. Rather, we must only
recognize that greater intervention in the market is warranted in some cases
in order to achieve specific objectives, and the form of the intervention
should flow from those objectives and take into account the nature of the
activity being influenced. Innovation and commercialization in any
scientific field depends on regulatory frameworks, intellectual property
rights as well as several other factors. 6 Therefore to correct the
deficiencies that currently pervade the biomarkers market and advance the
goal of personalized medicine, what is needed is a regime that integrates
regulatory and patent reforms.
Scholars together with scientists,
representatives of the biopharmaceutical industry, and policy-makers must
seize upon that task.

235. MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY, 17 (2008).
236. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L.
REv. 1575 (2003). See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 345 (2007), for a detailed account of the increasing
importance of regulatory standards and process in light of changes in biopharmaceutical
innovation.
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